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UPDATE 
 
Two important developments have taken place since the final 
edit of this paper.  First, on July 20, 2017, the United Nations Work-
ing Group on the use of mercenaries submitted, to the Human 
Rights Council, the findings of a four-year global study on the na-
tional legislation on private military companies in sixty countries, 
finding that:  national laws “were not strong or consistent enough” 
to properly regulate the private military industry;1 “weak national 
legislation and enforcement mechanisms, along with ad hoc and 
fragmented industry self-regulation, cannot address human rights 
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Baker Award.  The preparation of this piece has incurred many pleasant debts.  I 
would like to thank Alka Pradhan for comments, guidance and encouragement on 
the original version of this paper, written for her International Human Rights Post-
9/11 course in the spring 2015 semester.  This piece is a revised and updated           
version of the original.  I am also grateful to the scholars whose thoughtful and 
well-reasoned works I have cited.  Additional thanks are due to the Journal’s          
editorial staff for their diligence and patience, particularly Anthony Paladino,     
Elizabeth Sahner, and Rose Kenerson, as well as the team of editors for their careful 
work and helpful comments.  Finally, a special debt of gratitude is owed to Adam 
Glenn for his inexhaustible support and merciless editorial review.  The usual         
caveats apply to any opinions, errors or omissions. 
1 UN expert panel calls for new international standards on private military and secu-
rity companies, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Sept. 15, 2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/Dis-
playNews.aspx?NewsID=22081. 
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concerns effectively;” and increasing reliance on the private military 
industry raises “serious questions about the legitimacy of the pri-
vate use of force” and States’ ability to provide accountability and 
effective remedies to victims of human rights abuses committed by 
private military contractors.2  As such, the Working Group strongly 
reiterated the need for an international, legally binding convention 
to ensure adequate human rights protections for all affected by the 
activities of the private military industry.  Second, on August 4, 
2017, a federal appeals court vacated the murder conviction of a for-
mer Blackwater private military contractor and ordered resentenc-
ing for three others involved in the deadly 2007 Nisour Square trag-
edy that killed or injured at least 31 Iraqi civilians.3  As discussed 
below, the eventual convictions of these four individuals were con-
sidered anomalies as private military contractors have largely oper-
ated without legal oversight or consequences.  This new ruling 
could result in significantly reduced sentences for the three contrac-
tors, and it is unclear what, if anything, will happen to the fourth.  
While these developments are notable, they do not change the anal-
ysis of this article, but instead support its conclusions and opinions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
2 U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenar-
ies as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People 
to Self-Determination, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/47 (Jul. 20, 2017), https://docu-
ments-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/218/09/PDF/G1721809.pdf?OpenElement.  
This report provides a comprehensive overview of the human rights implications 
of the current inadequate and incomplete legal regime concerning the private mili-
tary industry.  
3 United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 820 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 4, 2017) (“For the 
foregoing reasons, we vacate defendant Nicholas Slatten’s first degree murder con-
viction and remand for a new trial.  Further, we vacate defendant Evan Liberty’s 
conviction for the attempted manslaughter of Mahdi Al-Faraji.  The Court remands 
the sentences of Liberty, defendant Paul Slough and defendant Dustin Heard for 
resentencing consistent with this opinion.  In all other respects, the Court affirms 
the judgment of the district court.”); see United States v. Slough, infra note 11 (de-
tailing the original convictions and sentencing of the four Blackwater contractors). 
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1.  THE LANDSCAPE OF A CHANGING WAR, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
UTILIZATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS 
 
On September 16, 2007, Ahmed Haithem Ahmed was driving 
his mother to a hospital to pick up his father.4  As they turned into 
Nisour Square, a busy, crowded traffic circle in Baghdad, four ar-
mored vehicles carrying private military contractors working for the 
U.S. State Department rounded the same circle.  Within moments, 
the contractors fired a bullet through Ahmed’s head, killing him in-
stantly.  With Ahmed’s car continuing to move slowly forward as 
his foot remained pressed on the accelerator, the contractors un-
leashed a barrage of sniper fire, machine gun bullets and explosives, 
killing Ahmed’s mother, and fifteen other innocent, unarmed Iraqi 
citizens, including young children.5  According to Blackwater USA, 
the private military firm (“PMF”) that employed these contractors, 
their contractors were fired upon, and “responded appropriately.”6  
According to all witnesses, a consistent account was described:  The 
attack by the contractors was unprovoked.7 
At that time, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 (“CPA 
Order 17”) provided private military contractors (“PMCs”) operat-
ing in Iraq with immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law until 
the end of occupation.8  One year after this tragedy, the Blackwater 
contractors involved were indicted by a U.S. court on manslaughter 
charges.9  Charges were ultimately dismissed due to the govern-
ment’s mishandling of the case.10 
																																								 																				
4 James Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.ny-
times.com/2007/10/03/world/middleeast/03firefight.html?pagewanted=all 
[https://perma.cc/JJ6W-UTH3] (describing the incident and subsequent investiga-
tions). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 17, Status of the Coalition, Foreign 
Liaison Missions, their Personnel and Contractors, CPA/ORD/26 June 2003/17.  
9 United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 128 (D.D.C. 2009).  On December 
4, 2008, the second grand jury returned an indictment against the defendants, 
charging them with voluntary manslaughter and weapons violations based on the 
Nisour Square incident. Id. 
10 See id. at 144–66 (explaining his decision to dismiss, Judge Ricardo Urbina 
cited numerous instances in which crucial evidence and witnesses had been tainted 
by exposure to the defendants’ early statements). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/3
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Seven years after the killing of these seventeen Iraqi civilians, 
four of the contractors were re-charged and eventually sentenced for 
these crimes.11  The fifth contractor, who testified against his four ex-
colleagues, pled guilty to manslaughter and received a one-year sen-
tence with the possibility of early release.12  Mohammed Hafedh Ab-
dulrazzaq Kinani, an Iraqi citizen whose nine-year-old son, Ali, was 
killed in the Square that day, stated that Blackwater “was so power-
ful that its employees could kill anyone and get away with it . . . 
[they] ‘had power like Saddam Hussein.’”13  According to a State 
Department investigator, “Blackwater contractors saw themselves 
as above the law.”14 
The United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries 
as a means of violating human rights (“Working Group on Merce-
naries”) commended the Blackwater prosecutions but noted that, 
“such examples of accountability are the exception rather than the 
rule.  The outsourcing of security to these companies by States create 
risks for human rights.”15  The expert body stressed the need for the 
																																								 																				
11 See, e.g., United States v. Slough, No. 08CR360-1, 2015 WL 1872002, at *1 
(D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2015) (judgment and sentence). For their roles, Nicholas A. Slatten, 
a sniper who the government stated provoked the massacre by firing the first shots, 
was sentenced to life in prison on one count of murder; Dustin L. Heard, Evan S. 
Liberty and Paul A. Slough, who used a machine gun during the attack, were sen-
tenced to thirty years and one day each on multiple counts of manslaughter, at-
tempted manslaughter, and weapons charges. Office of Pub. Affairs, Four Former 
Blackwater Employees Sentenced to Decades in Prison for Fatal 2007 Shootings in Iraq, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE: NEWS (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-for-
mer-blackwater-employees-sentenced-decades-prison-fatal-2007-shootings-iraq 
[https://perma.cc/ZVY9-UUD4].  
12 See Spencer S. Hsu, Blackwater Guard Who Testified Against 4 Others Sentenced 
for 2007 Shootings, WASH. POST (July 16, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/local/crime/blackwater-guard-who-testified-against-4-others-sen-
tenced-for-2007-shootings/2015/07/16/251056e6-2b5d-11e5-a250-
42bd812efc09_story.html [https://perma.cc/EB4Y-NKV2] (describing how Judge 
Royce C. Lamberth, presiding judge in Slough, departed from sentencing guidelines 
and sentenced Jeremy Ridgeway to one year and a day in a minimum-security 
prison, with the possibility of early release for good behavior). 
13 Matt Apuzzo, Ex-Blackwater Guards Given Long Terms for Killing Iraqis, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/us/ex-blackwater-
guards-sentenced-to-prison-in-2007-killings-of-iraqi-civil-
ians.html?emc=edit_th_20150414&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=46625794 
[https://perma.cc/EKE9-TY2M]. 
14 Faiza Patel & Dan Stone, A Primer on Legal Developments Regarding Private 
Military Contractors, LAWFARE (July 18, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.lawfare-
blog.com/2014/07/a-primer-on-legal-developments-regarding-private-military-
contractors/ [https://perma.cc/LX53-ZZCT]. 
15 Blackwater Convictions: ‘The exception, not the rule” – U.N. Expert Body Calls for 
Global Regulation of Private Security, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN 
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international regulation of PMFs’ activities, stating that “[t]he diffi-
culty in bringing a prosecution in this case shows the need for an 
international treaty to address the increasingly significant role that 
private military companies play in transnational conflicts.”16 
The Nisour Square tragedy committed by the PMCs of Blackwa-
ter (rebranded as Academi, after a brief rename as Xe) was unfortu-
nately only one of numerous incidents involving PMCs committing 
serious human rights abuses.  A Majority Staff memorandum pre-
pared for a hearing before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform stated, “Blackwater’s use of force in Iraq is 
frequent and extensive, resulting in significant casualties and prop-
erty damage,” and in an overwhelming majority of firearm dis-
charges (eighty-four percent (84%)), Blackwater PMCs were “first to 
fire.”17 
A more infamous case of PMCs’ misconduct was the 2004 Abu 
Ghraib incident, in which prison personnel committed a series of se-
vere human rights violations against detainees, including torture, 
rape and murder.  Several contractors of the PMFs, CACI and Titan 
(now known as L-3 Corporation), were implicated in perpetrating 
these abuses.18  It is reported that nearly half of the interrogators at 
Abu Ghraib were PMCs.19  While a few of the U.S. military officers 
																																								 																				
RIGHTS (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15
217 [https://perma.cc/TA67-PAXG]. 
16 Blackwater Sentencing – U.N. Experts on Mercenaries Call for International Reg-
ulation of Private Security, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 
14, 2015), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15
840&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/5AK8-VQ6Y]. 
17 MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 110TH CONG., 
MEMORANDUM ON ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT BLACKWATER USA 6, 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20071001121609.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8EK-2JY3]. 
18 See Renae Merle, CACI and Titan Sued over Iraq Operations, WASH. POST (June 
10, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29564-
2004Jun9.html [https://perma.cc/WX5F-T84H] (reporting on lawsuit against 
CACI and Titan on behalf of Iraqi prisoners “accusing the government contractors 
of conspiring with U.S. officials to abuse Iraqi detainees and failing to properly su-
pervise their own employees”).  
19 Scott Horton, Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em: Six Questions 
for P.W. Singer, HARPER’S MAGAZINE: BROWSINGS, (Sept. 30, 2007, 12:02 AM), 
http://harpers.org/blog/2007/09/cant-win-with-em-cant-go-to-war-without-
em-six-questions-for-pw-singer/ [https://perma.cc/DCF9-Z6QB]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/3
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involved in the scandal were tried and convicted, none of the PMCs 
involved have been prosecuted.20 
Following the Abu Ghraib incident, in 2005 the “Trophy Video” 
appeared on a website linked unofficially to PMCs working for Ae-
gis Defence Services, a PMF that was contracted by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense (“DoD”) to conduct operations in Iraq.21  The video, 
with dubbed music of Elvis Presley, contained four separate clips of 
PMCs shooting indiscriminately at civilian cars.22  Despite this vis-
ual evidence, the U.S. Army determined that there was “no probable 
cause to believe that a crime was committed” and no one was 
charged or prosecuted.23 
In 2006, contractors employed by the PMF Triple Canopy were 
travelling to the airport, when one stated “I want to kill someone 
today.”24  Unprovoked, he opened fired on Iraqis driving peaceably 
along the highway.25  The PMCs did not stop to determine if causal-
ities resulted, though all accounts suggest civilians died in this at-
tack.26  The contractor responsible was never charged.27 
																																								 																				
20 See U.S. Defence Contractor Wants Abu Ghraib Lawsuit Scrapped, AL JAZEERA 
AMERICA (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/defence-con-
tractor-abu-ghraib-lawsuit-scrapped-150208152855366.html 
[https://perma.cc/5HJK-2QQB] (describing lawsuit against CACI and contractor’s 
response).  
21 Sean Rayment, ‘Trophy’ Video Exposes Private Security Contractors Shooting up 
Iraqi Drivers, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 27, 2005), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1504161/Trophy-video-ex-
poses-private-security-contractors-shooting-up-Iraqi-drivers.html 
[https://perma.cc/UU7K-MJRR]. 
22 Footage of the video. Lands Knecht, Aegis Shooting Iraqis with Elvis Sound-
track (June 2, 2015), YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NzdVRtTDvso [https://perma.cc/W6ER-
L46G]. 
23 Jonathan Finer, Contractors Cleared in Videotaped Attacks, WASH. POST (June 
11, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2006/06/10/AR2006061001011.html [https://perma.cc/VNH3-LZ7C]. 
24 Steve Fainaru, Hired Guns are Wild Cards in Iraq War, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 16, 
2007), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-04-16/news/0704160004_1_triple-
canopy-security-contractors-shootings; [https://perma.cc/9VNA-222P]. 
25 Id.; see also Scott Horton, A Decision in the Triple Canopy Case, HARPER’S 
MAGAZINE: BROWSINGS (Aug. 3, 2007, 7:40 AM), http://harp-
ers.org/blog/2007/08/a-decision-in-the-triple-canopy-case/ 
[https://perma.cc/7JD3-9QFG] (stating two Triple Canopy employees were fired 
for failing to immediately report incident).  
26 Fainaru, supra note 24. 
27 Id. 
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In late 2013, a case was brought under the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act and the Alien Tort Statue against former Halliburton 
subsidiary, Kellogg, Brown & Root (“KBR”), for labor trafficking 
twelve Nepali men.28  These men were persuaded to accept employ-
ment by KBR under a false promise of work in hotels and restau-
rants in safe countries.29  Instead, they were transported to Iraq to 
work on U.S. military bases.30  En route, eleven of these men were 
captured and executed by Iraqi insurgents.31  A U.S. court allowed 
the case to proceed to trial, however a federal court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of KBR, “notwithstanding its wholehearted 
sympathy with the victims and their families.”32 
PMFs have also participated in covert operations, including 
clandestine raids and detention in Iraq and Afghanistan; the CIA’s 
extraordinary rendition program, in which eight-five percent (85%) 
of the detention and interrogation positions were held by contrac-
tors;33 the staffing and equipping of CIA black sites; and operation 
of the CIA’s Predator drone program.34  Based on its alleged involve-
ment in the rendition program, a suit was brought against the PMF, 
Jeppesen DataPlan, on behalf of five individuals who were held at 
																																								 																				
28 Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 994 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
29 Steven M. Watt, Court Rejects Military Contractor’s Attempt to Avoid Trial for 
Human Trafficking, ACLU: SPEAK FREELY (Aug. 26, 2013, 4:21 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/court-rejects-military-contractors-attempt-avoid-
trial-human-trafficking [https://perma.cc/Z5DN-LCWW] (discussing the context 
of the case and the federal court’s order that the case proceed to trial). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1015 (S.D. Tex. 2015), 
aff’d, Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017). 
33 S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and 
Interrogation Program, Findings and Conclusions 12 (Dec. 13, 2012) (declassified Dec. 
3, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/SSCIStudyCIAsDetentionInterroga-
tionProgramES.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MYQ-AM6C]. 
34 See, e.g., James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, Blackwater Guards Tied to Secret C.I.A. 
Raids, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/us/poli-
tics/11blackwater.html [https://perma.cc/VZ5Z-H4YJ] (reporting on Blackwater 
guards’ participation in C.I.A. raids, the transportation of detainees, and other se-
cret operations); Eur. Parl. Ass., Memorandum of Comm. on Legal Affairs and Hum. 
Rts., Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States, Doc. AS/JUR (2006) 
03 rev (analyzing secret detention in Council of Europe member countries); Human 
Rights Council, Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the 
Context of Counter Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/42 (May 20, 2010) (describing 
secret detention practices in the “war on terror.”).   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/3
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various CIA black sites and subjected to severe physical and psycho-
logical torture.35The case was dismissed as a result of the govern-
ment’s use of the “state secrets privilege” doctrine, an evidentiary 
rule that permits the government to refuse to produce, or block dis-
covery of, information that it deems would endanger national secu-
rity.36 
The examples above represent only a small sample of the publi-
cized cases in which human rights abuses have been perpetrated by 
PMCs.  In the United States’ most recent review before the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, concern was advanced regard-
ing: 
the limited number of investigations, prosecutions and con-
victions of . . . agents of the United States Government, in-
cluding private contractors, for unlawful killings during in-
ternational operations, and the use of torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of detainees 
in United States custody, including outside its territory, as 
part of the so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques.37 
Unfortunately, the Blackwater verdict was, as the Working 
Group on Mercenaries noted, an anomaly, albeit a welcomed one, in 
the course of holding PMCs to account.38  Since its formation in 2006, 
the Working Group on Mercenaries has collected and reviewed 
																																								 																				
35 Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. de-
nied, 563 U.S. 1002 (2011). 
36 Id. at 1073.  The court expressed its frustration with the use of the state se-
crets privilege in this case, which the dissent recognized by stating:  “The majority 
concludes its opinion with a recommendation of alternative remedies.  Not only are 
these remedies insufficient, but their suggestion understates the severity of the con-
sequences to Plaintiffs from the denial of judicial relief.”  Id. at 1101 (Hawkins, C.J., 
dissenting).  Further, the dissent argued “[a]rbitrary imprisonment and torture un-
der any circumstance is a ‘gross and notorious . . . act of despotism.’ . . . . But ‘con-
finement [and abuse] of the person, by secretly hurrying him to [prison], where his 
sufferings are unknown or forgotten; is a less public, a less striking, and therefore 
a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.’ . . . .”  Id. (alteration in original) 
(citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  
37 U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Peri-
odic Report of the United States of America, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 
23, 2014). 
38 Matt Taylor, Is the Blackwater Verdict the Beginning of the End for Private Mili-
tary Contractors? VICE (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.vice.com/read/is-the-blackwa-
ter-verdict-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-private-military-contractors-1024 
[https://perma.cc/E5UX-4AHS]. 
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“ample information which indicate the negative impact of the activ-
ities” of PMFs and PMCs and the “cluster of human rights viola-
tions” that they have perpetrated.39  According to the Working 
Group’s former chairperson, José L. Gómez del Prado, in this cluster 
“one can find: summary executions, acts of torture, cases of arbitrary 
detention; of trafficking of persons; serious health damages caused 
by their activities; as well as attempts against the right of self-deter-
mination.”40  Gómez del Prado also noted the violations that PMCs 
themselves experience as a result of PMFs’ “search for profit,” as 
PMFs often “do not provide their employees with basic rights, and 
put staff in situations of danger and vulnerability.”41 
“International law is based on the concept of the state.  The state 
in its turn lies upon the foundation of sovereignty.”42  As such, states 
have sovereign rights and responsibilities, such as security of the 
nation.  However, the state, particularly the United States, has out-
sourced much of its national security efforts to the private sector.  
Now, instead of providing full military, security and intelligence 
services, governments are hiring private actors to carry out activities 
that have long been considered responsibilities of the state.43  The 
United States has cited cost, quality, efficiency, and the need for ad-
ditional personnel, as prime reasons for a shift to the private sector.44  
																																								 																				
39 José L. Gómez del Prado, The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Mili-
tary and Security Companies, THE CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION (July 1, 
2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-privatization-of-war-mercenaries-pri-
vate-military-and-security-companies-pmsc/21826 [https://perma.cc/4RAD-
GM8P]. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 331 (4th ed. 1997). 
43 See Laura Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the 
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 147 
(2005) (noting private actors are increasingly fulfilling states’ foreign affairs func-
tions). 
44 See MOSHE SCHWARTZ & JENNIFER CHURCH, CONG. RES. SERV., R43074, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF CONTRACTORS TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS: 
BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, Summary (2013) (listing the ben-
efits of using contractors such as “freeing up uniformed personnel to conduct com-
bat operations; providing expertise in specialized fields . . . and providing a surge 
capability”).  Contra, e.g., MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 
supra note 14, at 14 (footnotes omitted) (“According to contract documents obtained 
by the Committee, Blackwater bills the United States at $l,222 per day for one indi-
vidual Protective Security Specialist.  On an annual basis, this amounts to $445,891 
per contractor.  These costs are significantly higher than the costs that would be 
incurred by the military.  The security services provided by Blackwater would typ-
ically be performed by an Army Sergeant, whose salary, housing, and subsistence 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/3
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Some contend that the notion of the “state as the only legitimate 
holder of the monopoly on the use of force” is being eroded as a 
result.45 
The outsourcing of traditionally state functions to PMFs has dis-
tanced these functions from the supervision of both the state and the 
military chain of command.  As a result, the lack of a watchful eye 
increases the risk that human rights abuses can be perpetuated with 
impunity.  This largely unregulated environment has been said to 
incentivize states to outsource military and security functions to 
PMFs, in order to avoid both legal and public opinion accountability 
that would otherwise be in place if the state were the direct actor.46 
Modern warfare has evolved immensely and a staple feature of 
this evolution is the emergence of new non-state actors (i.e. PMFs, 
PMCs) “playing central roles” in conflicts,47  and the legal status of 
these actors is difficult to determine within the existing regime of 
international law.48  Some argue that the growth in the privatization 
of war has outpaced the evolution of international law, rendering it 
ineffective at regulating this new shift in warfare.49  Despite efforts 
																																								 																				
pay range from approximately $140 to $190 per day, depending on rank and years 
of service.  On an annual basis, the salary, housing, and subsistence pay of an Army 
Sergeant ranges from $51,100 to $69,350 per year.  The amount the government pays 
Blackwater for these same services is approximately six to nine times greater.”). 
45 NICHOLAS TSAGOURIAS & NIGEL D. WHITE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THEORY, 
LAW AND PRACTICE 148 (2013). 
46 See Virginia Newell & Benedict Sheehy, Corporate Militaries and States: Actors, 
Interactions and Reactions, 41 TEX. INT’L L. J. 67, 91 (2006) (describing one commenta-
tor disclosed the strategy behind the United States’ decision to use PMFs in Sudan 
was to avoid congressional oversight); see also Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountabil-
ity: The Constitutional, Democratic and Strategic Problems With Privatizing War, 82 
WASH. U.L.Q. 1001, 1037 (2004) (noting when three American contractors were 
killed in Gaza the incident “did not become a serious media or diplomatic story”). 
47 Daphné Richemond-Barak, Nonstate Actors in Armed Conflicts: Issues of Dis-
tinction and Reciprocity, in NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 106, 108 (William Banks ed., 2010). 
48 See id. (“Nonstate actors find themselves somewhere along the spectrum of 
the traditional ‘black-and-white’ civilian/combatant divide, though the laws of war 
contemplate not a spectrum but rather clear-cut criteria.”).  
49 See, e.g., Peter W. Singer, War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Mili-
tary Firms and International Law, COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 522, 525–26 (2004) 
(“While private, profit-motivated military actors are as old as the history of orga-
nized warfare, the international laws of war that specifically deal with their pres-
ence and activity are largely absent or ineffective.  Particularly with regard to PMFs, 
what little law exists has been rendered outdated by the new ways in which these 
companies operate.  In short, international law, as it stands now, is too primitive in 
this area to handle such a complex issue that has emerged just in the last decade.”). 
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by multiple actors, including governments, PMFs, international or-
ganizations, and civil society, no legal regime exist that directly gov-
ern and oversees the actions of all PMFs and PMCs.  Commentators 
note that efforts to regulate these entities “have been spectacularly 
unsuccessful,”50 and that the “[PMF] industry, which deals with 
heavy weaponry in conflict zones[,] is less regulated than the toy 
industry.”51 
As the number of conflict situations proliferate globally, clarifi-
cation of the pertinent legal obligations of PMFs and PMCs is espe-
cially needed as their participation in war and conflict continues to 
increase.  Until this happens, the lack of a clear legal framework in 
which to place PMFs and PMCs, allows them to operate in a “legal 
gap,” and as such, violations of human rights can occur without ac-
count or fair and proper remedy, as is required under international 
human rights law.52 
This paper proceeds by reviewing the existing international and 
domestic regimes relevant to PMFs and PMCs.  Section 2 briefly dis-
cusses the nature of PMFs and PMCs; Section 3 reviews the devel-
opment and use of the private military industry since September 11, 
2001; Section 4 reviews the existing legal and regulatory frameworks 
in place that apply to PMFs and PMCs, using the United States as an 
exemplar; Section 5 analyzes the doctrine of state responsibility and 
PMCs’ actions as attributed to the state; Section 6 discusses the draft 
convention on PMFs and the need for an international legal regime 
to regulate the utilization of PMCs; Section VII concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
50 Simon Chesterman, Leashing the Dogs of War: The Rise of Private Military and 
Security Companies, 5 CARNEGIE REP. 36, 39 (2008). 
51 ‘Guns for hire’, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 29, 
2010), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Gunsforhire.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/XWJ4-QP22]. 
52 The right to an effective remedy is widely recognized under international 
human rights law.  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, art. 8, (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
art. 2(3) Dec. 16, 1966, U.N Doc. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 14, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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2.  THE NATURE OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS AND CONTRACTORS 
 
Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince (1532) proclaimed mercenaries 
to be “useless and dangerous,” “disunited” and “treacherous.”53  
Machiavelli believed that mercenaries lacked any moral reason to 
fight, as their motivation was purely financial gain.  He wrote that 
“republics that possess their own armies are . . . successful, whereas 
mercenary armies . . . only cause harm.”54  Around the time of his 
writing, the employment of mercenaries became restricted, and by 
the nineteenth century a norm against their use developed due to 
“general moral objections to private military force,” as it was be-
lieved that fighting should be motivated by love of country and not 
wealth.55  By the twentieth century, these ideas were codified in the 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions56 and the United 
Nations International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Fi-
nancing and Training of Mercenaries.57 
As noted by Gómez del Prado, PMCs “have increasingly taken 
over the traditional activities carried out by mercenaries before.”58  
However, while PMCs may carry out some of the same activities, 
PMCs largely fall outside the narrow definition of a mercenary as 
codified in international law.  According to Article 47 of Additional 
Protocol I and Article 1 of the Convention against Mercenaries, a 
mercenary is defined as, inter alia, any person who: 
is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on be-
																																								 																				
53 NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 43 (Quentin Skinner & Russell Price eds. 
1988). 
54 Id. at 44. 
55 JAMES PATTISON, THE MORALITY OF PRIVATE WAR: THE CHALLENGE OF PRIVATE 
MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES 1–2 (2014). 
56 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 47, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter, Additional Protocol I]. 
57 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and 
Training of Mercenaries, Dec. 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S. 96 [hereinafter, Convention 
Against Mercenaries]. 
58 José L. Gómez del Prado, Mercenaries, Private Military and Security Companies 
and International Law 1 (UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries) (un-
published working paper) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law) available at http://www.law.wisc.edu/gls/docu-
ments/gomez_del_prado_paper.doc [https://perma.cc/4RAD-GM8P].  
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half of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substan-
tially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of sim-
ilar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
[and] 
is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident 
of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict . . . .59 
Such a restrictive and highly particularized definition provides 
easy carve-outs and shields states from potential violations of inter-
national law in the course of employing PMCs—even in functions 
appearing quite similar to that of mercenaries.60  For instance, an in-
dividual functioning in all capacities as a mercenary will be insu-
lated from this definition, if she or he is a national of, or a resident 
in, a state party to the conflict in which such person is taking part.  
Additionally, the subjective nature of the definition, relying on the 
individual’s motivation to take part in hostilities, rather than their 
role or function, adds another layer of protection.  Proving that an 
individual is “essentially” motivated by financial gain is problem-
atic, as many other motivating factors could simultaneously under-
lie one’s motivation to fight (e.g., one’s belief in a just cause).  That 
no one has been prosecuted for serving as a mercenary since the 
Convention against Mercenaries came into force in 2001 might best 
demonstrate the difficulty in applying this definition to PMCs.61 
While a strong international norm against mercenaries exists, 
the settled definition of a mercenary has created an ineffectual inter-
national law.  Sarah Percy explained that states devised the defini-
tion of mercenary in a way that “differentiated mercenaries from 
																																								 																				
59 Additional Protocol I, supra note 56, at art. 47(2)(c)–(d) (emphasis added); 
Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 57, at art. 1(1)(b)–(c) (emphasis added).  
See also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, International humanitarian law and private mili-
tary/security companies, (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/doc-
uments/faq/pmsc-faq-150908.htm [https://perma.cc/3CGZ-3UD6] (“The defini-
tion of mercenaries given by Article 47 of Additional Protocol I is very restrictive.  
To be a mercenary, an employee of a PMSC has to meet certain strict and cumula-
tive criteria.  For a start, no one who is a national of any of the parties to the conflict 
can be a mercenary.  Furthermore, a person must be employed with the aim of being 
directly involved in combat and motivated by the desire for private gain, and then 
the person must actually be doing that to be considered a mercenary.  As a result, 
most PMSC employees do not fall under the definition.”).  
60 PATTISON, supra note 55, at 144.  
61 Id. at 145. 
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other actors,” thereby creating easy loopholes for PMCs to fall out-
side of the definition.62  As Geoffrey Best famously stated, “any mer-
cenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to 
be shot – and his lawyer with him.”63 
While states still heavily rely on their citizen militaries, primarily 
in outright combat roles, several tasks traditionally reserved for a 
state’s military are being outsourced to PMFs, including security, in-
terrogation, intelligence, training forces, and logistical services.  The 
United Nations defines PMFs as, “a corporate entity which provides 
on a compensatory basis military and/or security services by phys-
ical persons and/or legal entities.”64  However, not all private firms 
“look alike, nor do they even serve the same markets.”65  Peter 
Singer’s categorization of PMFs is often used in scholarship on this 
issue, categorizing PMFs into three groups, based on the services 
rendered: (1) Military Provider Firms, (2) Military Consultant Firms, 
and (3) Military Support Firms.  Military Provider Firms are “defined 
by their focus on the tactical environment,” playing either an active 
combat role (e.g., combat pilot) or a defense role (e.g., security de-
tail).66  Military Consultant Firms “provide advisory and training ser-
vices integral to the operation and restructuring of a client’s armed 
																																								 																				
62 Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law, 61 INT’L ORG. 367, 367–70 
(2007). 
63 GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 375 n.83 (Columbia University Press) 
(1980). 
64 U.N. Human Rights Council, Annual report of the Working Group on the use of 
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 
peoples to self-determination, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/50 (June 30, 2014).  The Mon-
treux Document, discussed infra Section 4.3., defines PMCs as “private business en-
tities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they de-
scribe themselves.  Military and security services include, in particular, armed 
guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and 
other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; 
and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.”  Switzerland Fed-
eral Department of Foreign Affairs and International Committee of the Red Cross, 
The Montreux Document: On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Prac-
tices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During 
Armed Conflict, at 9, ¶9a (Sept. 17, 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/as-
sets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q6S-STGR] [hereinafter 
The Montreux Document]. 
65 PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED 
MILITARY INDUSTRY 88 (Cornell University Press ed. 2007) (2003).  
66 Id. at 92. 
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forces.”67  Military Support Firms provide “logistics, intelligence, 
technical support, supply, and transportation.”68 
A PMC employed to perform one category of work, such as 
“support,” often needs to perform another category of work, such 
as “provider,” should they need to engage in the use of force if “they 
come under attack while performing [support] services.”69  As illus-
trated, these terms cannot be perfectly applied in all cases, as some 
PMCs may show characteristics of more than one category simulta-
neously. Nevertheless, each category is unified by its basic func-
tion—offering “services that fall within the military domain.”70  As 
such, this paper uses the collective term private military firm 
(“PMF”) and private military contractor (“PMC”) to encompass en-
tities and individuals undertaking any of these functions, recogniz-
ing that PMCs “have the capacity to engage in hostilities, either of-
fensively or defensively” even though the initial category of 
contracted service may not always dictate that at the outset.71 
 
3.  THE USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS AND CONTRACTORS                                                             
BY THE UNITED STATES POST 9/11 
 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union, the U.S. defense budget was dramatically reduced, re-
sulting in a massive downsizing of the country’s armed forces.72  
																																								 																				
67 Id. at 95. 
68 Id. at 97. 
69 Richard Morgan, Professional Military Firms under International Law, 9 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 213, 216 (2008). 
70 SINGER, supra note 65, at 88. 
71 Morgan, supra note 69. 
72 See SINGER, supra note 65, at 49 (“[T]he end of the Cold War is at the heart of 
the emergence of the privatized military industry. . . . When the Berlin wall fell, an 
entire global order collapsed almost overnight.  The resultant effect on the supply 
and demand of military services created a security gap that the private market rush 
to fill.”); see also Renae Merle, More Civilians Accompanying U.S. Military, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/poli-
tics/2003/01/22/more-civilians-accompanying-us-military/43ffec3d-e84a-4a02-
a882-ef371b0a9ac7/?utm_term=.2d0f4859b4a5 [https://perma.cc/DR5W-MEM9] 
(“Starting after ‘91, you had the combination of the military being forced to down-
size and this real push to privatize anything and everything.”); DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE, ACHIEVING A 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE, REPORT OF THE 
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW, iv (1997) (describing the change in America’s mili-
tary policy and stating “[s]ince 1985, America has responded to the vast global 
changes by reducing its defense budget by some [thirty-eight] percent, its force 
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With thousands of former military personnel out of work, there was 
a surplus of individuals with military expertise and PMFs provided 
employment for those possessing such skills.73  In the 1990s, the 
United States’ use of PMCs was sparse, contracting PMCs primarily 
in Latin America for counternarcotic efforts, and in the Balkans dur-
ing the prolonged unrest following the breakup of the former Yugo-
slavia.74  However, the War on Terror and the conflicts related to it, 
created a new demand for military capacity.  The United States, lack-
ing a sufficient supply of soldiers to meet this demand, and without 
mandated military service, which was last used during the Nixon 
Administration, found that PMCs were there to meet the need.75 
For their interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United 
States, as well as the United Kingdom, contracted with a conglom-
erate of PMFs on a mammoth scale.  To illustrate, during the First 
Gulf War (1990–1991) there was roughly one PMC for every 100 sol-
diers; however, by 2008 that ratio had shifted to one for one.76  In 
Afghanistan alone, the number of U.S.-contracted PMCs eclipsed 
the number of U.S. soldiers, with a ratio of 1.6 PMCs per soldier.77  
																																								 																				
structure by [thirty-three] percent, and its procurement programs by [sixty-three] 
percent.”). 
73 See Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Chal-
lenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C.L. REV. 989, 997 (2005) 
(“Yet the downsizing of major military efforts at the end of the Cold War and the 
end of apartheid in South Africa created a supply of individuals with military train-
ing in this country and elsewhere who could market their services.”). 
74 Michaels, supra note 46, at 1020–21, 1024–26. 
75 See Minow, supra note 73, at 996–97 (“Private military companies—not 
merely individuals offering their services as mercenaries—have a long lineage, but 
never have been more central to the U.S. military strategy than in the deployment 
in Iraq. . . . Private military companies guard U.S. generals, essential military sites, 
and U.S. government compounds in Iraq.”); see also Sean McFate, America’s Addic-
tion to Mercenaries, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/international/archive/2016/08/iraq-afghanistan-contractor-pentagon-
obama/495731/ [https://perma.cc/P4QY-272J] (“As former Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld said in 2002, the Iraq War would take ‘five days or five weeks or 
five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that.’  When these 
wars did not end in mere months, the all-volunteer force found it could not recruit 
enough volunteers to sustain two long wars.  That left policymakers with three ter-
rible options.  First, withdraw and concede the fight to the terrorists (unthinkable).  
Second, institute a Vietnam-like draft to fill the ranks (political suicide).  Third, 
bring in contractors to fill the ranks. Not surprisingly, both the Bush and Obama 
administrations opted for contractors.”). 
76 James Pattison, The Ethics of a Mercenary, Oxford University Press Blog (Nov. 
2, 2014), http://blog.oup.com/2014/11/mercenary-ethics-ukraine/ 
[https://perma.cc/BCH8-23BW] (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
77 Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
ARNPRIESTER_FINALIZED.DOCX 
1206 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:4 
By the end of 2008, there were over 266,600 PMCs working for the 
DoD in Iraq, Afghanistan, and surrounding regions (i.e. U.S. Central 
Command), of which 41,000 were U.S. citizens.78  By 2016, there were 
approximately three U.S.-contracted PMCs to every U.S. soldier in 
Afghanistan, and nearly two to one, respectively, in Iraq.79  These 
figures do not include PMCs employed by the CIA or other intelli-
gence agencies. 
Public opinion works against the deployment of U.S. troops to 
armed conflicts, however, augmenting the military force with PMCs 
can mask the number of individuals fighting (i.e. “boots on the 
ground”) on the behalf of a state when it decides to engage, or ex-
pand involvement, in a conflict.  According to former U.S. Under 
Secretary of Defense Robert Hale, “[i]n my experience, [the DoD] 
sometimes uses contractors in order to satisfy political pressure to 
limit the number of federal civilians even though contractors can 
cost more than federal civilians.”80  Similarly, former House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich contended that “given Americans’ reticence about 
using our troops,” the “best way to fight” is “by mercenaries.”81 
In 2015, former U.S. President Barack Obama sent draft legisla-
tion to Congress requesting authorization to use military force 
against the Islamic State (also known as ISIL or ISIS), which would 
include approval for the “limited” use of ground troops.82  However, 
																																								 																				
78 Department of Defense Appropriations for 2010: Hearing before the H. Subcommit-
tee of the Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. (statement of Gen. Ross Thompson, 
Military Deputy to the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Lo-
gistics and Technology), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111hhrg56232/html/CHRG-111hhrg56232.htm [https://perma.cc/R6V4-QE3Z]. 
79 Micah Zenko, Mercenaries Are the Silent Majority of Obama’s Military, FOREIGN 
POLICY (May 18, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/18/private-contrac-
tors-are-the-silent-majority-of-obamas-military-mercenaries-iraq-afghani-
stan/[https://perma.cc/E9YE-V4VB]. 
80 Robert F. Hale, Business Reform in the Department of Defense, CENTER FOR A 
NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.cnas.org/publications/re-
ports/business-reform-in-the-department-of-defense [https://perma.cc/FSR4-
RYAS]. 
81 Robert Weiner & Daniel Wallace, Military Contractors Belie Myth of U.S. Leav-
ing Afghanistan and Iraq, CLEVELAND (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.cleve-
land.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/04/military_contractors_believe_m.html 
[https://perma.cc/V94Q-PUGU]. 
82 Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, Letter from the 
President—Authorization for the Use of United States Armed Forces in connection 
with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, to The Congress of the United States 
(Feb. 11, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2015/02/11/letter-president-authorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-
connection [https://perma.cc/P525-RECX]. 
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limited use of ground troops did not necessarily mean a limited 
ground force, and it was expected that a large number of PMCs 
would be hired to augment this force.83  Additionally, President 
Obama implemented a no-ground troop policy in Yemen, yet re-
ports indicate that the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, 
hired PMCs to assist in the conflict.84  However, since the U.S. gov-
ernment is not transparent about its use of contractors, a figure of 
the number of PMCs utilized cannot be accurately determined.85  
This was not lost upon U.S. Senator John McCain who in a 2016 sub-
committee hearing told acting Secretary of the Army Patrick Mur-
phy, “[w]e look forward to the day you can tell us how many con-
tractors are employed in the Department of Defense.”86 
																																								 																				
83 Eli Lake, Contractors Ready to Cash in on ISIS War, THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 13, 
2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/13/contractors-ready-to-
cash-in-on-isis-war.html [https://perma.cc/P525-RECX]. 
84 Paul Rogers, Saudi Arabia’s Yemen Offensive is Bigger than Anyone Expected, 
THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 2, 2015), http://theconversation.com/saudi-arabias-
yemen-offensive-is-bigger-than-anyone-expected-39706 [https://perma.cc/94TH-
9ER9]; see also Finian Cunningham, Pentagon Mercenaries: Blackwater, Al-Qaeda . . . 
What’s in a Name?, RT INT’L (Feb. 21, 2016), https://www.rt.com/op-edge/333186-
blackwater-yemen-mercenaries-pentagon/ [https://perma.cc/9VNA-222P] 
(“CIA-linked private ‘security’ companies are fighting in Yemen for the US-backed 
Saudi military campaign.”).  There are also reports that the United Arab Emirates 
has sent Colombian mercenaries to fight in the conflict.  See, e.g., Emily B. Hager & 
Mark Mazzetti, Emirates Secretly Sends Colombian Mercenaries to Yemen Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/mid-
dleeast/emirates-secretly-sends-colombian-mercenaries-to-fight-in-yemen.html 
[https://perma.cc/G8MS-J9GZ]. 
85 Zenko, supra note 79 (“The first thing you learn when studying the role con-
tractors play in U.S. military operations is there’s no easy way to do so.  The U.S. 
government offers no practical overview, especially for the decade after 9/11.  U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM) began to release data on contractors only in the 
second half of 2007— no other geographic combatant command provides such data 
for their area of operations . . . .  Moreover, the role, scope, and size of military 
contractors are never mentioned when there is a new announcement of a U.S. troop 
deployment to Iraq or Syria.  Journalists rarely ask Pentagon spokespersons or mil-
itary commanders how many contractors will be deployed alongside the troops.  
On the rare occasions they do, the military representative never has any estimates 
available.”) 
86 Video: Army Force Posture and Readiness—Acting Army Secretary Patrick Mur-
phy and Chief of Staff General Mark Milley’s Testimonies on Worldwide Threats and Chal-
lenges Facing the U.S. Army, its Operations and Structure (C-SPAN, April 7, 2016), 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?407828-1/hearing-us-army-posture&start=2052 
[https://perma.cc/3XE7-ZFP7]. 
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On March 16, 2017, President Donald Trump released his 
“America First” budget blueprint,87  which requested $639 billion for 
the DoD for the 2018 fiscal year—a $52 billion increase from the pre-
vious year.88  The budget proposal does not detail specifically how 
funding will be allocated; thus, it remains to be seen how President 
Trump’s foreign and military policies will interact with the PMF sec-
tor.  However, based on many of his political appointees’ and advi-
sors’ close ties to the PMF industry, America’s use of PMCs does not 
appear to be decreasing anytime soon.89  And, as sectarian violence 
and wars continue across the Middle East region, there will be a con-
stant growth of demand for weapons and military services, provid-
ing increased opportunities for PMFs. 
While states have been the largest user of PMCs, PMFs have ex-
panded their clientele to include “opposition groups, national re-
sistance movements, criminal organizations, multinational corpora-
tions, individuals, non-governmental organizations that carry out 
humanitarian activities, and even international intergovernmental 
																																								 																				
87 Presidential Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, President of the United 
States (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2017/01/28/plan-defeat-islamic-state-iraq [https://perma.cc/2VYQ-Y6MU]. 
88 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET 
BLUEPRINT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR OF 2018 (2017) 
15, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018
/2018_blueprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/GMX6-CXAM]. 
89 Trump’s former national security advisor, Michael Flynn, had extensive 
dealings with PMFs through his company, Flynn Intel Group. David Kocieniew-
ski, Trump Security Aide Flynn Has Deep Ties to Defense Contractors, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 
16, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/trump-secu-
rity-aide-flynn-has-deep-ties-to-defense-contractors [https://perma.cc/2DEG-
GB9V].  Also, President Trump’s Secretary of Defense, General James Mattis, led 
Operation Vigilant Resolve, a battle started in part in retaliation for the killing of 
four Blackwater PMCs.  Mike Dowling, 7 Things You Didn’t Know About the First 
Battle of Fallujah, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/7-things-about-the-first-battle-of-fallujah-2015-4.  Furthermore, 
Blackwater founder, Erik Prince, reportedly advised the Trump transition team on 
intelligence and defense matters, including recommendations for positions to the 
Departments of Defense and State.  Prince now heads a Hong-Kong-based PMF.  
Prince also has a close relationship with Trump’s former chief strategist, Stephen 
Bannon; is the brother of Besty DeVos, Trump’s Secretary of Education; and he and 
his family gave large sums of money to then-candidate Trump’s Super PAC.  Jer-
emy Scahill, Notorious Mercenary Erik Prince is Advising Trump from the Shadows, THE 
INTERCEPT (Jan. 17, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/01/17/notorious-merce-
nary-erik-prince-is-advising-trump-from-the-shadows/[https://perma.cc/TV7L-
57YB]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/3
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organizations such as the United Nations.”90  Even a jihadi private 
military firm has recently emerged, providing services and support 
to help overthrow regimes and establish strict Islamic govern-
ments.91 
Commentators have noted that it is becoming increasingly im-
possible to wage war without relying on a supplemental privatized 
military force,92 and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(“ICRC”) has stated that “[p]rivate security firms are an established 
feature of the 21st century war landscape.”93  As such, minimum 
standards must be established to regulate PMFs and the actions of 
their contractors. 
 
4.  THE “LEGAL GAP” IN WHICH PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS AND 
CONTRACTORS OPERATE 
 
4.1.  International Law 
 
There is considerable debate regarding how the current rules 
governing the conduct of war apply to PMCs.  Presently there are 
																																								 																				
90 Vanessa B. Moya, The Privatization of the Use of Force Meets the Law of State 
Responsibility, 30 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 795, 807 (2015). For further discussion of how 
PMFs have spread across markets, see generally Mohamad Ghazi Janaby, The Legal 
Status of Employees of Private Military/Security Companies Participating in U.N. Peace-
keeping Operations, 13 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 82 (2015) (discussing the questiona-
ble legal status of PMFs hired by the United Nations); Åse Gilje Østensen, In the 
Business of Peace: The Political Influence of Private Military and Security Companies on 
U.N. Peacekeeping, 20 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 33 (2013) (discussing the United Nations’ 
employment of PMFs); Deane-Peter Baker & James Pattison, The Principled Case for 
Employing Private Military and Security Companies in Interventions for Human Rights 
Purposes, 29 J. APPLIED PHIL. 1 (2012) (questioning the merits of using private mili-
tary and security companies to remedy human rights violations).  
91 Malhama Tactical is considered the world’s first known jihadi PMF, consist-
ing of ten well-trained fighters.  In recruiting materials, the PMF states that it is a 
“fun and friendly team,” which provides such benefits as vacation time and “one 
day off a week from jihad.” Christian Borys, Eric Woods, & Rao Komar, The Black-
water of Jihad, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 10, 2017) http://foreignpol-
icy.com/2017/02/10/the-world-first-jihadi-private-military-contractor-syria-rus-
sia-malhama-tactical/ [https://perma.cc/TJU5-KB4N]. 
92 See, e.g., PATTISON, supra note 55, at 2.  
93 The ICRC to Expand Contacts with Private Military and Security Companies, 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Aug. 4, 2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/re-
sources/documents/misc/63he58.htm [https://perma.cc/269N-ATT5].  
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no international laws or legal instruments that apply specifically to 
PMCs and their conduct.  In addition to the lack of specific reference 
to PMCs in treaty law, there is neither consensus on their status, nor 
their activities under international law.  The Working Group on 
Mercenaries has repeatedly raised the issue of this “legal gap” in 
which PMCs are able to operate.94 
International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) sets forth the legal lim-
its to conduct in war.  As IHL was developing prior to the end of the 
Cold War, PMCs were not a significant part of warfare or the legal 
landscape, resulting in their status today being ambiguous and un-
defined.95  As such, scholars disagree over how even the most basic 
tenant of IHL applies to PMCs, that of classifying an entity as either 
a civilian or combatant,96 either of which demands a different stand-
ard of behavior.97  The distinction between the two carries with it 
different obligations and protections, depending on one’s member-
ship in either category.  According to the ICRC, the only institution 
named under IHL as a controlling authority, the status of a PMC is 
determined “on a case-by-case basis, in particular according to the 
nature and circumstances of the functions in which they are in-
volved.”98  The ICRC notes that unless the PMC is “incorporated in 
																																								 																				
94 See, e.g., U.N. Body Urges Support for Treaty Regulating Private Military, Secu-
rity Companies, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Apr. 30, 2010), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10
000&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/3TDQ-WRVK] (“It’s high time to close the legal 
gap for private military and security contractors . . . .”). 
95 See Won Kidane, The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International 
Humanitarian Law, 38 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 361, 364 (2010) (“In the post-Cold 
War era, the legal regulation of armed conflict has been complicated by the advent 
of a remarkable new player: the privatized military industry . . . .  Because IHL took 
its current shape and form prior to and during the Cold War, the new players were 
not a significant part of the equation.  As such, the status of today’s private military 
contractors is ambiguous at best.”). 
96 Id.; see also Nicholas Maisel, Strange Bedfellows: Private Military Companies and 
Humanitarian Organizations, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 639, 644 (2015) (“The principle of dis-
tinction—summarized in Article 48 of the First Additional Protocol (‘API’) as ‘the 
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population 
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accord-
ingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives’ is the cornerstone 
of the laws of war.”). 
97 Maisel, supra note 96, at 644. 
98 International Humanitarian Law and Private Military/Security Companies – FAQ, 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.icrc.org/en/docu-
ment/ihl-and-private-military-security-companies-faq [https://perma.cc/NL97-
MFCU] [hereinafter ICRC, FAQ].  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/3
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the armed forces of a State or have combat functions for an orga-
nized armed group belonging to a party to the conflict,” the PMC’s 
status is that of a civilian.99  However, should the PMC do something 
that would “amount to taking a direct part in hostilities,” the PMC 
would lose civilian status and be considered a combatant.100  Ac-
cordingly, PMCs are only considered combatants if they either (1) 
(a) are incorporated into the state’s armed forces or (b) fight for a 
party to the conflict or (2) take a direct part in hostilities. 
For the first element, since the second part (b) relates to fighting 
for a non-state entity (e.g., terrorist organizations, rebel groups), this 
will not be evaluated given its rare occurrence and the general ina-
bility to regulate such actors in the first place.101  For the first part of 
the first element, most commentators have argued the bar for incor-
poration of PMCs into a state’s armed forces is quite high.  This 
would make sense given that the entire purpose of privatization is 
to transfer to the private sector that which was previously under the 
purview of the government.  Therefore, it would seem at odds with 
the point of outsourcing to maintain that PMCs were nevertheless 
members of the state’s armed forces.102  Most commentators contend 
that for PMCs to be formally incorporated, they must be incorpo-
rated via domestic legislation.103  Thus, PMCs are rarely considered 
combatants under this criterion.  Notably, the United States does not 
																																								 																				
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 See Michael Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities 
by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 522 (2005) (“[R]ebel 
forces are unlikely to hire civilians or contractors.”); Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guid-
ance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
Law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 23–25 (2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/as-
sets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P7V-M3LG] (discussing 
the “meaning and significance of ‘belonging to’ a party to a conflict”).  
102 Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Companies: Their Status Under Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and its Impact on Their Regulation, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
573, 583 (2006). 
103 See Alice S. Debarre, U.S.-Hired Private Military and Security Companies in 
Armed Conflict: Indirect Participation and its Consequences, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 437, 
442, n.23 (2016) (“Proponents of the formal approach argue that to be combatants 
under Article 43 AP I, PMSC employees would have to be formally incorporated 
by the state in the armed forces, in compliance with relevant domestic legislation.”).  
For further discussion, see generally Mirko Sossai, Status of Private Military Compa-
nies’ Personnel in the Laws of War: The Question of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 5 
(EUI Working Paper, AEL 2009/6) (“[W]hat is required is the formal incorporation 
by the State, in order to put the private contractors within the military chain of 
command and control.  Therefore, membership in an armed force remains primar-
ily regulated by domestic legislation.”). 
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consider PMCs to be combatants, but “civilians authorized to ac-
company the force in the field.”104 
Since under this first element, the majority of PMCs are consid-
ered civilians, the important question becomes whether PMCs are 
directly participating in hostilities and therefore lose their civilian 
status.  This too is subject to considerable legal debate and scholar-
ship on what it means to take direct part in hostilities.105  The ICRC 
has provided illustrative examples of “direct participation in hostil-
ities” including “[g]uarding military bases against attacks from the 
opposing party, gathering tactical military intelligence and operat-
ing weapons systems in a combat operation.”106  Unlike a soldier, 
who is always considered a combatant even if not directly partici-
pating in hostilities, a PMC’s status changes depending on what ac-
tion the PMC is taking at the time of consideration. 
The ICRC has taken note of how the use of PMCs has muddled 
the distinction between civilians and combatants.107  Gómez del 
Prado emphasized that PMCs operate in “extremely blurred situa-
tions where the frontiers are difficult to separate.”108  He explains 
that PMCs “carry and use weapons, interrogate prisoners, load 
bombs, drive military trucks and fulfill other essential military func-
tions,” yet due to their status under the law, they evade accountabil-
ity, whereas their military counterparts that carry out the same func-
tions cannot.109  That individuals serving in roughly the same 
functions, and taking almost identical actions, can be considered ci-
vilians—thereby falling outside of the military’s chain of command 
and the obligations and laws binding military action in similar cir-
																																								 																				
104 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-100.21, CONTRACTORS ON THE 
BATTLEFIELD, ch. 1 (Jan. 2003), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/li-
brary/policy/army/fm/3-100-21/chap1.htm [https://perma.cc/GM8N-PQQA]. 
105 See, e.g., Stephen Pomper, Toward a Limited Consensus on the Loss of Civilian 
Immunity in Non-International Armed Conflict: Making Progress Through Practice, in 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 181, 182 (Ken-
neth Watkin & Andrew Norris eds., 2012) (discussing when an individual loses 
protection from attack through membership in an organized armed group and re-
lated questions of what it means to take direct part in hostilities). 
106 ICRC, FAQ, supra note 98. 
107 Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions & Answers, INT’L COMM. OF THE 
RED CROSS (June 2, 2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/docu-
ments/faq/direct-participation-ihl-faq-020609.htm [https://perma.cc/C8S4-
U2M9].  
108 Gómez del Prado, supra note 39. 
109 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/3
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cumstances—raises a very real legal inconsistency.  This incon-
sistency was well-illustrated in the Abu Ghraib abuse incident, 
where military personnel were court-martialed and convicted, while 
their PMC counterparts escaped prosecution altogether.  In its re-
port to the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Working 
Group on Mercenaries noted that “[s]ome Governments appear to 
consider these [PMCs] as neither civilians nor combatants, though 
heavily armed; these individuals are the new modalities of merce-
narism.”110 
 
4.2.  U.S. Law 
 
The United States is the world’s largest consumer of private mil-
itary services.  As such, this Section only provides a review of U.S. 
law, while acknowledging that other states may have various do-
mestic laws that relate to the use of PMCs, their services, and their 
violations of human rights. 
After the Nisour Square tragedy, the Iraqi government insisted 
charges be brought against the PMCs who perpetrated the crimes.111  
Initially the United States refused to prosecute, and as discussed, it 
was not until seven years later that convictions were handed down 
to some involved.  Convictions in this case were the exception, not 
the rule.  For example, the PMCs involved in torture and other 
abuses at Abu Ghraib prison have never been prosecuted, despite 
the junior military officers being court-martialed for their joint par-
ticipation.112  Here, the PMCs could neither be court-martialed, as 
																																								 																				
110 U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Use of Merce-
naries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of 
People to Self-Determination, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7 (Jan. 9, 2008), http://doc-
uments-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/100/75/PDF/G0810075.pdf?OpenElement. 
111 Amanda Taub, Blackwater’s Baghdad Massacre is a Reminder of how the US Be-
came what it Hated in Iraq, VOX (Apr. 15, 2015, 9:20 AM), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/4/15/8419825/blackwater-iraq-war-failure 
[https://perma.cc/QSF4-T68B] (“After the [Nisour Square] massacre, the Iraqi 
government demanded that the contractors stand trial in Iraq, but the US refused.”).  
112  Id. (“There were plenty of good reason why the [United States] didn’t agree 
to subject its personnel to the Iraqi justice system.  And the [United States] justice 
system did eventually work in the Blackwater case.”).  
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they were not military personnel, nor could they be prosecuted un-
der Iraqi law, given the immunity granted under CPA Order 17, 
which was in place at the time of these offenses.113 
Such immunity agreements have been standard practice, based 
on the logic that states have their own accountability and reporting 
procedures (e.g., court-martial) that govern and discipline their 
state’s military personnel.  CPA Order 17, however, included im-
munity for PMCs as well, despite that they were not subject to equiv-
alent procedures.  Thus, PMCs were both immune from Iraqi law 
and exempt from the U.S. procedures that would traditionally gov-
ern individuals occupying the roles and undertaking the tasks for 
which PMCs were hired. 
The rationale behind CPA Order 17 was that the Iraqi justice sys-
tem was incapable of providing U.S. soldiers or PMCs with due pro-
cess guarantees or safety in detention.114  The Working Group on 
Mercenaries noted “[t]he combined effect of the immunity clause 
contained in CPA Order 17 and the failure to prosecute [PMCs] . . . 
has led to impunity for human rights violations against Iraqi civil-
ians . . .” and an “ongoing failure to hold accountable those involved 
in such violations and to provide an effective remedy . . . .”115  Im-
munity was in place from 2003 through January 2009, at which time 
the United States and Iraq signed a Status of Forces Agreement 
(“SOFA”) that removed immunity for contractors of the DoD, 
																																								 																				
113 See, e.g., Patel & Stone, supra note 14 (“Under rules issued by the U.S.-led 
Coalition Provisional Authority, contractors couldn’t be prosecuted in Iraqi courts.  
While such immunity is standard for military personnel, it is also typically accom-
panied by a regular system of reporting and accountability for those who commit 
crimes.  But military contractors in Iraq weren’t subject to equivalent procedures 
and generally managed to escape prosecution.”).  
114 See CHRISTOPHER KINSEY, PRIVATE CONTRACTORS AND THE RECONSTRUCTION 
OF IRAQ: TRANSFORMING MILITARY LOGISTICS 131 (Routledge 2009) (“The order was 
the result of the concern about the condition of the Iraqi justice system, which at the 
time could neither ensure the safety of foreign nationals nor guarantee due pro-
cess.”) 
115 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mer-
cenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of 
Peoples to Self-determination, Addendum: Mission to Iraq, ¶69, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/18/32/Add.4 (Aug. 12, 2011), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/154/62/PDF/G1115462.pdf?OpenElement.   
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though contractors of other U.S. departments (e.g., State Depart-
ment), retained immunity.116  Since the SOFA was signed, no U.S.–
hired PMCs have been subjected to the Iraqi judicial system.117 
In the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib and the Nisour Square inci-
dents, the United States enacted reforms to its domestic laws as they 
related to PMCs.118  The Blackwater defendants were charged under 
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA),119 a statute that 
																																								 																				
116 SARAH K. COTTON, ET AL., RAND NAT’L SECURITY RES. DIVISION, HIRED GUNS: 
VIEWS ABOUT ARMED CONTRACTORS IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 15 (2010), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/mono-
graphs/2010/RAND_MG987.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD8H-7ZT6].  For a discus-
sion on Iraq’s right to assert criminal and civil jurisdiction over the various contrac-
tors hired by different U.S. agencies, see R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40011, U.S.-IRAQ WITHDRAWAL/STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT: ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 7–10 (2009), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40011.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP99-6KTR] (dis-
cussing statutory and procedural schemes for jurisdictions and prosecutions). 
117 CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMANITARIAN LAW, AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF 
LAW, MONTREUX FIVE YEARS ON: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT 
MONTREUX DOCUMENT LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND GOOD PRACTICES 117 (Rebecca 
DeWinter-Schmitt et al. eds., 2013), https://www.wcl.american.edu/hum-
right/center/resources/publications/documents/YESMontreuxFv31.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RKX6-G4W4] [hereinafter MONTREUX FIVE YEARS ON] (“[S]ince 
the coming into force of the SOFA in 2009, Iraqi courts have been used only in one 
instance to convict a British PMSC employee found guilty of killing two other 
PMSC employees (one British and the other Australian) and injuring an Iraqi 
guard . . . .”).  This was the case of Daniel Fitzsimons, who was reported to have 
had a violent past and to have been suffering from post–traumatic stress disorder.  
Id. at 23.  There were additional allegations that PMFs were not properly vetting 
those they employed.  See Caroline Davies, Briton Danny Fitzsimons Jailed in Iraq for 
Contractors’ Murders, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2011, 12:23 PM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2011/feb/28/danny-fitzsimons-jailed-iraq-murders 
[https://perma.cc/LD6X-AM6A] (“[Fitzsimons’s stepmother and father] called for 
legislation to help vet those hired by private security firms.”).  
118  Charles Tiefer, No More Nisour Squares: Legal Control of Private Security Con-
tractors in Iraq and After, 88 OR. L. REV. 745, 755–56 (2009) (footnote omitted) (“After 
Abu Ghraib, it became apparent that the statute did not apply to contractors that 
were not technically hired under DOD contract, even when they performed work 
with the military and the non-DOD was just a technicality.  So, Congress amended 
the law to reach contractors ‘supporting the mission of the DOD.’”).  
119 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 (2004) (providing criminal penalties for “offenses 
committed by certain members of the Armed Forces and by persons employed by 
or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States”); see also New Charges 
in 2007 Blackwater Shootings in Iraq, AL JAZEERA AM. (Oct. 17, 2013, 10:00 PM), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/17/new-charges-in-blackwater-
shootings.html [https://perma.cc/5FPH-PL3U] (describing new grand jury indict-
ment of Blackwater defendants after federal court of appeals reinstated); Erica 
Teichert, Blackwater Case Tests DOJ Authority Over Contractors Abroad, LAW360 (June 
19, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/549630/blackwater-case-tests-doj-
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allows the government to prosecute specific government employees 
and certain PMCs for crimes committed abroad.120  The MEJA covers 
PMCs working for U.S. agencies, but only to the extent that their 
employment is “related” to supporting the mission of the DoD.121  
The jurisdiction of MEJA does not apply to PMCs whose employ-
ment is not considered “related” to the DoD’s mission.122 
Peter W. Singer reported that over the four years following the 
Iraq occupation, there were only 20 cases sent to the Department of 
Justice under the MEJA, with only one prosecution that time.123  He 
noted that this was a peculiarly low number given the 160,000 PMCs 
that operated in Iraq over this period, and joked that either the 
																																								 																				
authority-over-contractors-abroad (“Under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion Act, employees whose work internationally ‘relates to supporting the mission 
of the Department of Defense’ and who violate U.S. law while abroad can be tried 
in the [United States].  But the statute’s language is ambiguous and doesn’t provide 
criteria to determine when non-DOD contractors are supporting the agency’s mis-
sion.”).  
120 JENNIFER K. ELSEA, MOSHE SCHWARTZ & KENNON H. NAKAMURA, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL32419, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, 
LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 23 (2008) (footnote omitted), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX3U-7VDT] 
(“Persons who are ‘employed by or accompanying the armed forces’ overseas may 
be prosecuted under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000 
for any offense that would be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year 
if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.”).  
121 Id. at 23–24 (footnote omitted) (“Persons ‘[e]mployed by the armed forces’ 
is defined to include . . ., after October 8, 2004, civilian contractors and employees 
from other federal agencies and ‘any provisional authority,’ to the extent their em-
ployment is related to the support of the DOD mission overseas.”).   
122 Id. at 24 (“Depending on how broadly DOD’s mission is construed, MEJA 
does not appear to cover civilian and contract employees of agencies engaged in 
their own operations overseas.”).  
123 Horton, supra note 19 (“Indeed, there are reportedly as many as [twenty] 
MEJA cases that have been handed off to the Department of Justice the last few 
years related to Iraq and we have not yet seen prosecutions on them except for one.  
That [twenty], though, seems an incredibly low count considering we are talking 
about a community of 160,000 over [four] years, in a relatively [sic] zone of impu-
nity.”).  It was noting that “[v]ery few successful prosecutions involving DOD con-
tractors in Iraq under MEJA have been reported.  A contractor working in Baghdad 
pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography in February 2007.  Another con-
tract employee was prosecuted for abusive sexual contact involving a female sol-
dier that occurred at Talil Air Force Base in 2004.  A contract employee was indicted 
for assaulting another contractor with a knife in 2007.”  ELSEA, SCHWARTZ & 
NAKAMURA, supra note 118, at 25 (footnotes omitted).  
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United States “found the Stepford Village of Iraq . . . [o]r we have to 
admit we have a major problem.”124 
In 2007, Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(“UCMJ”) to subject PMCs to court–martial if they accompany the 
military in the field during times of counterinsurgency, or formally 
declared war—which has not happened since 1942.125  The constitu-
tionality of this change, however, has been debated.  In the past, U.S. 
courts have held that trying civilians, as most all PMCs are classi-
fied, in military courts is a constitutional violation of both due pro-
cess and the right to a trial by a civilian jury.126  Additionally, for 
charges to be brought against a military officer, and thereby be 
court-martialed, it is the responsibility of a commanding officer.  
Such a command structure is not in place for PMCs.127 
The Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“CEJA”), a bill that 
attempts to close the U.S. jurisdictional loophole for PMCs, has been 
introduced multiple times in the Senate by Senator Patrick Leahy.128  
While the MEJA provided the courts with jurisdiction over PMCs 
hired by the military, CEJA would expand jurisdiction over PMCs 
																																								 																				
124 Horton, supra note 19. 
125 COTTON ET AL., supra note 116, at 15 n.9 (“U.S. Senator Lindsay Graham in-
serted an amendment to the UCMJ into the fiscal year (FY) 2007 National Defense 
Authorization Act, placing civilian contractors accompanying the armed forces in 
the field under court–martial jurisdiction during times of contingency operations, 
in addition to times of declared war.”); see also ELSEA, SCHWARTZ & NAKAMURA, su-
pra note 117, at 26–28 (discussing potential constitutional challenges to court–mar-
tial for civilian contractors). 
126 ELSEA, SCHWARTZ & NAKAMURA, supra note 120, at 25–31 (footnote omitted) 
(“While the UCMJ offers soldiers procedural protections similar to and sometimes 
arguably superior to those in civilian courts, courts have been reluctant to extend 
military jurisdiction to civilians.”).  
127 See Marcus Hedahl, Unaccountable: The Current State of Private Military and 
Security Companies, 31 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 175, 183–84 (2012) (“Soldiers are account-
able to, and held accountable by, their commanding officer (CO)¾that is a central 
point of the UCMJ . . . . A CO, in turn, is responsible for holding soldiers accounta-
ble . . . .  Therefore, for members of PMSCs to be held individually and criminally 
accountable, there must be a clear and precise delineation of responsibility for 
PMSC individual criminal liability.”).   
128 See, e.g., Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2015, S. 1377, 114th 
Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/ s1377/BILLS-114s1377is.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P5GZ-SXCK] (noting Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the bill 
on May 19, 2015); Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2014, S. 2598, 113th 
Cong. (2014), https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/s2598/BILLS-113s2598is.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6WLY-ZQ3Q] (noting that Sen. Patrick Leahy introduced the 
bill on July 14, 2014). 
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hired by any U.S. department or agency.129  Furthermore, it would 
remove the requirement that in order to be liable, the contractor’s 
action took place in the course of providing support “related” to the 
mission of the DoD.130  While this bill would help to close the legal 
gap, it has continuously failed to pass the Senate. 
The United States is party to the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
(“CAT”), which requires countries to criminalize the use of torture 
within their own jurisdiction.131  The CAT is not self-executing,132 
however the United States enacted the Federal Torture Statute in 
1994,133 implementing provisions of the convention relating to acts 
of torture not already established in domestic law.  The statute crim-
inalizes torture committed by “a national of the United States” or an 
“offender present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality 
of the victim or alleged offender.”134  In this way, the statute creates 
liability for an American national who commits torture abroad, or a 
non-national who is presently in the United States and has commit-
ted torture.  No PMC has ever been convicted under this Statute.  In 
fact, the only individual that has ever been prosecuted under this 
statute was “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr., the son of former Liberian Presi-
dent and warlord Charles Taylor, for committing torture in Libe-
ria.135 
																																								 																				
129 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE CASE FOR THE CIVILIAN EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION ACT (CEJA): WHY U.S. NEEDS TO CLARIFY U.S. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
OVER U.S. CONTRACTORS FIELDED ABROAD 3 (2013), https://www.human-
rightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/CEJA-Fact-Sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MJZ6-QADE] (“CEJA would extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction 
over federal government contractors and employees fielded abroad for serious 
crimes committed while employed by any U.S. department or agency other than 
the Department of Defense without impacting the conduct of U.S. intelligence agen-
cies abroad.”).  
130 Id. (“There would be no requirement that the contract support the mission 
of the Department of Defense.”).  
131 Convention Against Torture, supra note 52, at art. 4, ¶1 (“Each State Party 
shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.”). 
132 S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, Sec. III(1) (1990), https://www.con-
gress.gov/treaty-document/100th-congress/20/resolution-text 
[https://perma.cc/AT3E-ZM3B].  
133 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2015).  
134 Id. at § 2340A(b)(1)–(2).  
135 William J. Aceves, United States v. George Tenet: A Federal Indictment for Tor-
ture, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 10–11 (2015) (noting Chuckie Taylor was the first 
and only case ever brought under the Torture Statute).  For the Belfast decision, see 
United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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The War Crimes Act imposes criminal liability on a U.S. national 
or a member of the U.S. military who commits a “grave breach” of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions or specified violation of Common Ar-
ticle 3 to the conventions, including, inter alia, murder, sexual as-
sault, torture, cruel and inhumane treatment, in the United States or 
abroad.136  The Bush Administration limited the scope of the Act 
with the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”),137 which rein-
terpreted provisions of the conventions, and removed reference to 
“humiliating and degrading treatment,”138 which is considered a 
grave breach under international law.  The MCA was seen by many 
as retroactively rewriting the War Crimes Act to serve as a type of 
amnesty for crimes committed in the War on Terror.139  To date, no 
one has been convicted under the War Crimes Act. 
The USA PATRIOT Act amended the “special maritime and ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the United States” (“SMTJ”),140 thereby ex-
tending the jurisdiction of federal courts over criminal offenses com-
mitted by U.S. nationals on the premises of U.S. diplomatic, military, 
or other entities in a foreign state.141  Only one PMC has ever been 
convicted under this Act, David Passaro, a contracted CIA interro-
gator who beat and tortured to death an Afghan detainee during an 
																																								 																				
136 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a)–(d) (2006).  
137 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 10 
U.S.C. § 948 (2009).  
138 Michael Ratner, The Uphill Battle for Habeas Corpus in George W. Bush’s Wash-
ington, D.C., THE NATION (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.thenation.com/article/push-
ing-back-detainee-act/ [https://perma.cc/V2YU-5JQT] (“Moreover, the President 
is now free to abuse and even torture those detained, using the slippery language 
of this legislation . . . .  And those who authorize or carry out torture techniques will 
have complete immunity from criminal prosecution.”).  
139 Id. (“Those who authorized the torture of detainees in the past will be 
granted retroactive immunity.  When this was tried in Argentina and Chile during 
their ‘dirty wars,’ it was called an amnesty, and, in the end, did not work.  War 
crimes cannot be amnestied.”).  
140 See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2010) (providing definition for SMTJ).   
141 MONTREUX FIVE YEARS ON, supra note 117, at 92 (“The USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001 amended the . . . [SMTJ] and makes portions of the criminal code applicable 
for offenses committed by or against U.S. nationals on U.S. military bases and em-
bassies located abroad as well as any place used by entities of the U.S. govern-
ment.”).  
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interrogation.142  In fact, Passaro is the first, and only, CIA interro-
gator prosecuted for any post-9/11 abuse.143  After serving six years, 
and despite an apparent lack of remorse, Passaro was released from 
prison.144 
Although these various U.S. laws have created some accounta-
bility for PMCs, the incredibly low number of prosecutions and con-
victions, despite continuing reports of violations, make clear that 
these provisions have not done enough to hold PMCs to account. 
An additional obstacle to accountability is the need for classified 
evidence in order to prosecute these cases.  On a number of occa-
sions, the U.S. government has argued that the evidence needed 
may be at odds with national security, citing any number of legal 
justifications, including the state secrets privilege.145  If a full review 
of evidence is deemed detrimental to national security, the Classi-
fied Information Procedures Act (CIPA) provides that a summary of 
the classified information may be entered instead as evidence.146  
																																								 																				
142 U.S. Att’y Office for E.D.N.C., Government Contract Employee Re-sentenced for 
Assault Charge, DEP’T OF JUSTICE: NEWS (Apr. 6, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/ar-
chive/usao/nce/press/2010/2010-apr-06.html [https://perma.cc/MF9P-W657] 
(“The assault took place while [Passaro] was working as an independent contract 
on behalf of the . . . [CIA] at a forward operating base in Afghanistan.  The case was 
the first charged under a provision of the Patriot Act which extended jurisdiction 
of United States District Courts to crimes committed by United States civilians on 
overseas installations.  The victim was an Afghan male whom the defendant had 
been asked to interrogate.  The victim died during the course of the interrogation.”).  
143 Convicted Former CIA Contractor Speaks Out About Prisoner Interrogation, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Apr. 20, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/con-
victed-former-cia-contractor-speaks-prisoner-interrogation/ 
[https://perma.cc/NT24-8GVD] (“The CIA told the NewsHour today that the 
agency stopped using contractors to do interrogations when President Obama 
ended the CIA’s program in January 2009 . . . .  As a result, Passaro’s case may go 
down in history books as the first, and only, case in which a CIA interrogator has 
been prosecuted for abusing a prisoner.”).  
144 See id. (stating Passaro served six years in prison).  During his interview, 
Passaro stated “[a]nything that I did to Abdul Wali [the victim], none of that con-
stitutes torture.  In hindsight, I wouldn’t have done anything different.”  Id.  
145 MONTREUX FIVE YEARS ON, supra note 117, at 94 (“The use of classified evi-
dence may be another barrier.  At times a defendant’s constitutional rights may be 
at odds with national security.”). CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R94-166, 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 23–40 (2012), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-166.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY2F-BRTY] (“Alt-
hough a substantial number of federal criminal statutes have undisputed extrater-
ritorial scope . . . , prosecutions have been relatively few.  Investigators and prose-
cutors face legal, practical, and often diplomatic obstacles that can daunting.”).  
146 DOYLE, supra note 145, at 40 (“The CIPA permits courts to approve prosecu-
tion prepared summaries of classified information to be disclosed to the defendant 
and introduced in evidence, as a substitute for the classified information.”).  
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However a summary is unlikely to “be strong enough to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”147  Moreover, information regard-
ing how the PMC’s employment relates to the mission of DoD may 
itself be classified, thereby precluding a charge under the MEJA in 
the first place.148 
Post-9/11, the U.S. government greatly expanded its use of the 
state secrets privilege.  Not only to deny access to evidence, but also 
to entirely foreclose the adjudication of cases by having those cases 
dismissed in the preliminary stages on account of national security 
arguments.149  An example is the case of El-Masri v. Tenet, in which 
a man was mistakenly detained though the U.S. rendition program, 
and subjected to severe torture, including beatings and sodomy at a 
CIA black site.150  Despite his case being widely known worldwide, 
it was dismissed based on the government’s use of state secrets priv-
ilege.151 
																																								 																				
147 MONTREUX FIVE YEARS ON, supra note 117, at 94. 
148 Holding Criminals Accountable: Extending Criminal Jurisdiction for Government 
Contractors and Employees Abroad: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 4–5 (2011) (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Di-
vision, Department of Justice), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/me-
dia/doc/11-5-25%20Breuer%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ8J-H3B8] 
(“Furthermore, in some instances, the relevant information concerning a defend-
ant’s employment and how it relates to the Defense Department’s mission may be 
classified.  Although the Justice Department may use procedures set out under the 
Classified Information Procedures Act, such procedures may not be adequate to 
protect national security information and also establish to a jury beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that a defendant is subject to MEJA.  In practice, this means that certain 
civilian U.S. Government employees and contractors can commit serious crimes 
overseas without fear of U.S. prosecution.”).  
149 State Secrets Privilege: Government Abuse of Power, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/factsheet_stateSecrets 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/97S5-MDDV] (last modified Jan. 11, 2011) (“Previous uses 
of the [state secrets privilege] by the government have most commonly been at the 
discovery stage, asking the courts to deny people access to documents or witnesses.  
More recently—and more troublingly—the government has invoked the [state se-
crets privilege] in the very beginning of cases to dismiss them altogether.”).  
150 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“Still blind-
folded, [El–Masri] alleges he was led to a building where he was beaten, stripped 
of clothing, and sodomized with a foreign object . . . .  When he regained his sight, 
he claims he saw seven or eight men dressed in black and wearing black ski masks.  
El–Masri contends that these men were members of a CIA ‘black rendition’ team, 
operating pursuant to unlawful CIA policies at the direction of defendant Tenet.”).  
151 See El-Masri v. Tenet, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/cases/el-masri-v-tenet [https://perma.cc/X2T2-3QNR] 
(last updated June 1, 2011) (“A judge dismissed the case in May 2006 after the gov-
ernment intervened, arguing that allowing the case to proceed would jeopardize 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
ARNPRIESTER_FINALIZED.DOCX 
1222 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:4 
Finally, the United States has entered into bilateral immunity 
agreements, or “Article 98 Agreements,” with at least 100 coun-
tries,152 in which both countries agree not to surrender “employees 
(including contractors), or military personnel” to the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court.153  Nearly all agreements, with the 
exception of Israel, are signed with lesser developed countries. 
The patchwork of U.S. laws and slack enforcement, among a 
myriad of other problems, have plagued meaningful prosecution of 
PMCs in the United States.  Few individuals have been prosecuted 
under the provisions reviewed, indicating that the system for crim-
inal accountability in the United States is likely not working effec-
tively.154  It has been reported that when human rights violations 
perpetrated by PMCs are dealt with, it is often as an administrative 
matter, instead of a criminal one.155  Despite numerous publicly 
known incidents, lawsuits, and criticism, the United States has yet 
to establish an effective system of accountability and oversight for 
																																								 																				
state secrets, despite the fact that Mr. El-Masri’s story was already known through-
out the world.  The ACLU appealed the dismissal in November 2006.  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the lower court decision that denied 
MR. El-Masri [sic] a hearing in the United States.  In October 2007, the United States 
Supreme Court refused to review Mr. El-Masri’s case.”). 
152 See, e.g., Countries that have Signed Article 98 Agreements with the U.S., 
GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY, 
http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=363527&p=2456099 
[https://perma.cc/33RU-BUVY] (last updated Jan. 31, 2017) (listing countries with 
signed Article 98 Agreements).  
153 See e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Transitional Islamic 
State of Afghanistan and the Government of the United States of America Regard-
ing the Surrender of Persons to the International Criminal Court, Afg.–U.S., Sept. 
20, 2002, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/library/research/guides/upload/Af-
ghanistan03-119.pdf [https://perma.cc/KSN6-Z6H9].  
154 See MONTREUX FIVE YEARS ON, supra note 117, at 90 (“To date there have been 
only a handful of successful convictions of PMSC personnel for criminal conduct.  
This would indicate that the system for criminal accountability is not working ef-
fectively considering the lack of prosecutions in known serious incidents of alleged 
human rights violations and anecdotal evidence in media . . . .”); see also Whitney 
Grespin, An Act of Faith: Building the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Providers, DIPLOMATIC COURIER (July 19, 2012), http://www.diplomaticourier.com 
/news/topics/security/1233-an-act-of-faith-building-the-international-code-of-
conduct-for -private-security-providers [https://perma.cc/9Q6S-STGR] (discuss-
ing the effect of the ICoC on PMCs).  
155 See, e.g., PATTISON, supra note 55, at 147 (“It has been alleged that the [State 
Department] deliberately dealt with criminal charges against Blackwater for viola-
tions of U.S. export laws (including the illegal export of weapons to Afghanistan 
and offering to train troops in South Sudan) as administrative matters so that this 
was not precluded from hiring the firm again.”). 
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the PMCs it employs.  Yet, even if the laws were comprehensive 
enough, a review of the United States’ use of these laws demon-
strates a lack of will to prosecute.  The reasons for this are varied; 
however, a prevalent one presumptively includes the desire to avoid 
an appearance of malfeasance, or to maintain the status quo, in order 
to have access to actors whose actions may fall outside the jurisdic-
tion and accountability of legal regimes that constrain the United 
States. 
 
4.3.  International Regulation 
 
States, civil society, and PMFs have undertaken efforts to regu-
late the industry through the creation of multi-stakeholder frame-
works.  Two prevailing characteristics of these frameworks are that 
they are entirely voluntary and legally non-binding.156  A recent 
framework, created following a joint initiative of Switzerland and 
the ICRC, was the Montreux Document on Pertinent International 
Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Opera-
tions of Private Military and Security Companies (2008) (“Montreux 
Document”).157  The stated purpose is to “promote respect for inter-
national humanitarian law and human rights law, whenever [PMFs] 
are present in armed conflicts.”158  The Montreux Document reiter-
ates international legal obligations as they relate to humanitarian 
and human rights law and provides an outline of “good practices” 
with regards to the use of PMCs.  The Montreux Document has been 
endorsed by several states, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as the European Union, the 
																																								 																				
156 See The Montreux Document, supra note 64, at 9, ¶¶ 3–4 (“That this document 
is not a legally binding instrument and does not affect existing obligations of 
States . . . . That this document should therefore not be interpreted as limiting, prej-
udicing or enhancing in any manner existing obligations under international law, 
or as creating or developing new obligations under international law . . . .”); INT’L 
CODE OF CONDUCT ASS’N , International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers, at 6, ¶ 14, (Nov. 9, 2010), https://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/re-
sources/ICoC_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCR3-PCT8] [hereinafter Private 
Security Service Providers] (“The Code itself creates no legal obligations and no legal 
liabilities on the Signatory Companies, beyond those which already exist under na-
tional or international law.  Nothing in this Code shall be interpreted as limiting or 
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law.”). 
157 The Montreux Document, supra note 64.  
158 Id. at 31.  
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”), and the Organiza-
tion for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”).159  Of the 
states that have signed the Montreux Document, Switzerland is the 
only one to have passed legislation attempting to place the Mon-
treux guidelines into effect.160 
It is unclear whether, though unlikely that, the Montreux Docu-
ment will have any meaningful impact on states’ behavior.  The Ini-
tiative for Human Rights and Business conducted a five-year review 
of the Montreux Document and found that states had “mixed rec-
ords of adhering to legal obligations and implementing the Good 
Practices[,]” which made “it is nearly impossible to assess whether 
or not the Montreux Document is having the desired impact of im-
proving human rights protections for people and communities af-
fected by [PMFs’] activities and ensuring accountability for miscon-
duct of [PMFs] and their personnel.”161  Furthermore, the study 
concluded that “[i]f successful criminal convictions, civil suits, or 
other forms of remedy such as reparations are a measure of impact, 
then cause for concern remains.”162  The study used the United 
States as an example of this, noting that “there have been only a 
handful of criminal cases against [PMF] personnel that resulted in 
conviction—this is so despite the numerous allegations of miscon-
duct . . . in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . .”163 
Building upon the Montreux Document, the International Code 
of Conduct for Private Security Services Providers (“ICoC”) was fi-
nalized in November 2010.164  It was considered a more encompass-
ing initiative that involved multiple stakeholders, including states, 
																																								 																				
159 Switz. Fed. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs, Participating States of the Montreux Doc-
ument, FDFA, https://www.fdfa.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/inter-
national-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-compa-
nies/participating-states.html [https://perma.cc/95AW-ZFGK] (last updated July 
7, 2016) (providing participating states and organizations). 
160 See generally Mercenary Services Outlawed by Parliament, SWISS INFO (Sept. 24, 
2013, 12:04 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/mercenary-services-outlawed-by-
parliament/36968406 [https://perma.cc/A72T-V5GB] (“Private security contrac-
tors based in Switzerland will no longer be allowed to provide mercenaries and will 
have to report to the federal authorities any services they plan to supply beyond 
the country’s borders.”).  
161 MONTREUX FIVE YEARS ON, supra note 117, at 157.  
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 See generally Int’l Code of Conduct Ass’n, History, 
https://www.icoca.ch/en/history [https://perma.cc/66PT-XQPB] (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2017) [hereinafter ICoC, History] (stating the ICoC “was finalized in No-
vember 2010” and signed by fifty-eight PMFs).  
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civil society, and PMFs.  Like the Montreux Document, the ICoC is 
a voluntary agreement with no binding force.  Unlike the Montreux 
Document’s focus on states’ obligation, the ICoC is directed toward 
PMFs’ obligations.165  The ICoC lays out guidelines and international 
standards on human rights for PMFs operating in areas experienc-
ing conflict and instability.166  The ICoC was initially signed by 58 
PMFs and grew to 708 by September 2013.167  At that time, the ICoC 
Association (“ICoCA”) was established as an oversight mechanism 
to monitor PMF compliance with the ICoC and process complaints 
regarding violations of the ICoC.168  The ICoCA has 118 members, 
including 92 PMFs (e.g., Blackwater, Triple Canopy); 18 civil society 
organizations (e.g., Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch); and 
7 states (e.g., United States, United Kingdom).169 
While such a framework is promising, it is worth maintaining 
appropriate caution.  PMFs played a large role in the creation of both 
the ICoC and the ICoCA, and they are disproportionately repre-
sented as compared to the overall ICoCA membership.  Such a dis-
parity can undermine the ICoCA’s independence as each member 
																																								 																				
165 Stuart Wallace, Eur. Comm’n on Fostering Human Rights Among Eur. Pol-
icies [FRAME], Case Study on Holding Private Military and Security Companies Ac-
countable for Human Rights Violations, 54, Deliverable No. 7.5 (Apr. 28, 2016), 
https://globalcampus.eiuc.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11825/80/25-Delivera-
ble-7.5.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/S77L-289Q] (“The ICoC 
is a spin off from the Montreux process.  While the Montreux process was directed 
toward the States’ obligations, the ICoC was directed toward the companies’ obli-
gations.”).  
166 ICoC, History, supra note 164 (“The [ICoC] is the fruit of a multi-stakeholder 
initiative launched by Switzerland, with the over-arching objectives to articulate 
human rights responsibilities of [PMFs], and to set out international principles and 
standards for the responsible provision of private security services, particularly 
when operating in complex environments.”).  
167 Id. (“The ICoC was finalized in November 2010, at which time it was signed 
by [fifty-eight PMFs].  By September 2013, 708 companies had formally committed 
to operate in accordance with the Code of Conduct.”).  
168 See Int’l Code of Conduct Ass’n, Frequently Asked Questions, 
https://www.icoca.ch/en/frequently-asked-questions 
[https://perma.cc/6WMN-3YHQ] (last visited Feb. 26, 2017) [hereinafter ICoC, 
Frequently Asked Questions] (“The principles for the responsible provision of private 
security services as contained in the Code can be broadly summarized in two cate-
gories:  first, principles regarding the conduct of PSC personnel based on interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law standards; and second, management 
and governance principles.”).  
169 See Int’l Code of Conduct Ass’n, Membership, 
http://www.icoca.ch/en/membership [https://perma.cc/YYG5-H5BZ] (last vis-
ited Feb. 26, 2017) (listing membership of PMFs, civil society organizations, and 
governments).  
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yields an equal vote on all matters, such as appointments to the 
Board of Directors, who in turn is responsible for monitoring PMFs’ 
actions.170  Thus, simply on account of consensus, PMFs hold signif-
icant weight in determining who is monitoring them and the deci-
sions made about their own activities. 
According to the ICoCA’s Complaints Procedure, a complaint 
submitted to the ICoCA against a PMF or PMC working for a PMF, 
is first redirected to the PMF’s own internal grievance mechanism.171  
Available remedies for victims from the PMF must comply with par-
agraph 67 of the ICoC,172 of which the only punitive measure out-
lined in this paragraph is taking “appropriate disciplinary action, 
which could include termination of employment . . . .”173  Where a 
complaint “involves allegations of criminal activity, and if it has 
taken place within a competent criminal jurisdiction, the matter will 
then be reported to the relevant authority for follow up.”174 
If the complainant alleges that the PMF’s grievance procedure is 
unfair or inaccessible, the ICoCA reviews the allegation.175  If the 
ICoCA substantiates the allegation, the ICoCA either engages in di-
alogue with the complainant and the PMF to address the mecha-
nism’s inadequacies, or it may refer the complaint to another griev-
ance procedure (e.g., mediation).176  The ICoCA can suspend or 
terminate a PMF’s membership if the Board considers that the PMF 
“has failed to take reasonable corrective action,”177 however, the 
																																								 																				
170 See Int’l Code of Conduct Ass’n, Complaints, 
https://www.icoca.ch/en/complaints [https://perma.cc/GAW9-4JDF] (last vis-
ited Feb. 26, 2017) [hereinafter ICoC, Complaints] (providing information on sub-
stantive and procedural process for filing complaints).  
171 Id. 
172 See generally Int’l Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ 
Ass’n [ICoCA], Articles Of Association art. 13.2.3–5, https://icoca.ch/sites/de-
fault/files/resources/ICoC%20AoA_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENP6-3R36] 
[hereinafter, Articles of Association] (discussing compliance with ICoC’s paragraph 
67).  
173 Private Security Service Providers, supra note 156, at 15, ¶67(f).  
174 ICoC, Complaints, supra note 170. 
175 See Articles of Association, supra note 172, art. 13.2.3 (“If a complaint alleges 
that a grievance procedure provided by a relevant Member company is not fair, not 
accessible, does not or cannot offer and effective remedy, or otherwise does not 
comply with paragraph 67 of the Code, the Secretariat shall review that allega-
tion.”).  
176 See generally id. art. 13.2.4–5 (providing a mechanism for conducting com-
plaint review).  
177 Id. art. 13.2.7. 
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ICoCA “shall not impose a specific award on the parties,”178 mean-
ing it cannot confer a remedy to the victim. 
The ICoCA Complaint Procedure went into effect in September 
2016, and according to the ICoCA, would begin accepting com-
plaints in early 2017.179  Although it is not yet possible to assess the 
efficacy of this procedure, the options available seem to provide lit-
tle recourse to the victims of human rights violations at the hands of 
PMCs, as well as, punishment to those responsible.  Due to the 
ICoCA’s reliance on other mechanisms to handle complaints, this 
procedure does not itself provide any meaningful remedy to a vic-
tim.  Taking complaints to the PMF, or taking them to court, were 
always options that these victims had, so the ICoCA’s Compliant 
Procedure is of little additional benefit.  The issue has always been 
that prosecution within the courts was difficult because of the legal 
gaps that exist, and PMFs have generally tried to avoid accountabil-
ity for their bad actions.  The new procedures do very little to rem-
edy this problem. 
Despite the shortcomings of the ICoCA process, the ICoCA is 
not absent of all disciplinary authority, as it can suspend or termi-
nate a PMF’s membership, which potentially could have a negative 
effect on PMFs.  For example, in 2012, the United Nations released a 
document requiring contract bidders to be members of the ICoC.180  
In 2013, the State Department expressed an intention to require 
ICoCA membership as a condition for bidding on security contracts 
with the department.181  However, review of a 2016 State Depart-
ment audit appears to contradict this, as some contracted PMFs were 
																																								 																				
178 Id. art. 13.2.5. 
179 See ICoC, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 168 (“A Reporting, Moni-
toring and Assessing Performance Procedure (Article 12) was adopted by vote at 
the 2016 AGA, and forms the basis for monitoring operations, which are being in-
troduced and increasingly used during 2017.”).  
180 U.N. Sec. Mgmt. Sys., Dep’t of Safety & Sec., Security Management Operations 
Manual: Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Compa-
nies, at 6, ¶25(a) (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/      
Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/GuidelinesOnUseOfArmedSecurityServices.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3K3-F7SF] (stating PMFs “must be a member company” to the 
ICoC).  
181 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MONTREUX DOCUMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 4, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/226402.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AE3F-6REL] (“The Department also plans to make membership 
in the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA) a requirement in the bid-
ding process for the successor WPS contract, so long as the process moves forward 
as expected and the association attracts significant industry participation.”).  
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not ICoCA members.182  Also, the DoD, which utilizes PMFs on a 
much larger scale and spends considerably more money on their 
use, does not employ such a policy.183 
Since membership in the ICoCA is voluntary and obligations are 
directed at PMFs and not the states that employ them, only the PMFs 
that join the ICoCA are beholden to its oversight.184  While the 
ICoCA seems a constructive attempt at overseeing PMF actions, 
without comprehensive changes to the international legal frame-
work, including changes that provide direct accountability for hu-
man rights violations, PMFs and PMCs can continue to operate with 
impunity. 
 
5.  STATE RESPONSIBILITY & ATTRIBUTION OF LIABILITY 
 
In addition to the need for reforms that create individual and 
corporate accountability in cases of human rights abuses committed 
by PMFs and PMCs, the role of states in creating the current situa-
tion cannot be ignored.185  According to the ICRC, “States cannot ab-
solve themselves of their obligations under international humanitar-
ian law by contracting [PMCs].  They remain responsible for 
																																								 																				
182 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, AUD-MERO-16-
30, AUDIT OF BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY WORLDWIDE PROTECTIVE SERVICES 
CONTRACT TASK ORDER 8 —SECURITY SERVICES AT U.S. CONSULATE ERBIL 2–4 (Mar. 
2016), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/aud-mero-16-30.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K7ED-DT5S] (discussing office’s contract management and 
oversight without establishing ICoCA membership as precondition).  For example, 
upon review of the State Department’s 2016 audit of its Consulate in Erbil, Iraq, 
three contracted PMFs were not listed members on the ICoCA website: Global In-
tegrated Security, International Development Solutions, and Torres International.  
Id. 
183 See Office of the Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, 
Private Security Companies, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ps/psc.html [https://perma.cc/B27X-DTCC] (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2017) (“DoD will not require signature to the ICoC or certification 
and oversight by the ICoC Association as a condition of any DoD contracts.”). 
184 See Gabor Rona, A Tour de Horizon of Issues on the Agenda of the Mercenaries 
Working Group, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 324, 341–42 (2013) (“[T]he voluntary nature of 
the Code of Conduct means that it cannot meet the goal of ensuring that all {PMCs} 
are covered.”). 
185 See generally José L. Gómez del Prado, Impact on Human Rights of a New Non-
State Actor: Private Military and Security Companies, 18 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 151 
(2012) (discussing state responsibility and other factors contributing to impunity 
for human rights violations by PMFs and PMCs).  
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ensuring that the relevant standards are met and that the law is re-
spected.”186  The ICRC further notes that “[s]hould the staff of the 
[PMFs] commit violations of international humanitarian law, the 
State that has hired them may be responsible if the violations can be 
attributed to it as a matter of international law . . . .”187 
The doctrine of state responsibility governs the attribution to a 
state of violations of international law.188  The rules of attribution are 
codified in the International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility (“Draft Articles”).189  The Draft Articles 
are the product of over half a century of work by the ILC190 and were 
intended to influence the manifestation of the law of state responsi-
bility through state practice and case rulings, rather than progress-
ing into a convention.191  To determine attribution of PMCs’ actions 
to the state, three of the Draft Articles are particularly relevant, in-
cluding Article 4, “Conduct of organs of a State;” Article 5, “Conduct 
of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental author-
ity;” and Article 8, “Conduct directed or controlled by a State.”192 
																																								 																				
186 ICRC, FAQ, supra note 98.  
187 Id. 
188 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 43 
(2001), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HU3A-Q76H] [hereinafter, ILC Draft Articles] (providing text 
of Draft Articles) (“Article 1: Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails 
the international responsibility of that State.  Article 2: There is an internationally 
wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is at-
tributable to the State under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the State.”). 
189 See generally id. at 43–59.  
190 See Alan Nissel, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: Between Self-Help and 
Solidarity, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 355, 356 (2006) (stating Draft Articles were the 
“product of over five decades of ILC work and the ILC’s most ambitious venture 
since the Vienna Convention”).   
191 See James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Continuing Debate on a U.N. Con-
vention on State Responsibility, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 959, 971 (2005) (“[I]t may be 
expected that the position of the Articles as part of the fabric of general international 
law will be further consolidated and refined through their application by interna-
tional courts and tribunals.”); see also Fernando Lusa Bordin, Reflections of Customary 
International Law: The Authority of Codification Conventions and ILC Draft Articles in 
International Law, 63 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.  535, 541 (2014) (“[O]n the suggestion of 
Special Rapporteur James Crawford, the Commission recommended to the General 
Assembly that it take note of the Articles, which the Assembly did in Resolution 
56/83 of 12 December 2001.”). 
192 Id. at 44–45.  
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Article 4 codifies the principle that a state is liable for the acts of 
its organs, which are “person[s] or entit[ies] which [have] status in 
accordance with the internal law of the State.”193  Such organs in-
clude government agencies, police forces, and the armed forces.194  
An entity that has separate legal personality from the state, such as 
a private corporation—i.e. PMF—is not characterized as an organ of 
the state according to the doctrine.195  As such, it would be difficult 
to attribute actions of a PMF or PMC to the state under Article 4. 
Article 5 regards situations where the “person or entity” con-
cerned is not an organ of the state, but is still “exercis[ing] elements 
of governmental authority.”196  Under this article, there are two ele-
ments that must be met to establish state attribution: the entity or 
person (1) is exercising elements of governmental authority and (2) 
was empowered by the state’s law to do so. 
Examining the first element, the ILC Commentary states that 
“[b]eyond a certain limit, what is regarded as ‘governmental’ de-
pends on the particular society, its history and traditions.”197  While 
the Draft Articles do not provide a list of what constitutes an intrin-
sically state function, ILC Commentary has provided examples of 
entities exercising “government authority;” for example, “private 
security firms may be contracted to act as prison guards and in that 
capacity may exercise public powers such as powers of detention 
and discipline . . . .”198 
																																								 																				
193 Id. at 44. 
194 See, e.g., id. at 84 cmt.1 (“[A]rticle 4 states that the first principle of attribu-
tion for the purpose of State responsibility in international law—that the conduct 
of an organ of the State is attributable to that State.  The reference to a “State organ” 
covers all the individual or collective entities which make up the organization of 
the State and act on its behalf.  It includes any organ of any territorial governmental 
entity within the State on the same basis as the central governmental organs of that 
State: this is made clear in the final phrase.”).  
195 See Oliver R. Jones, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for the Actions 
of Private Military Firms, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 239, 263 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (“An 
entity that has a separate legal personality from the State, even if wholly controlled 
and owned by the State, is not an organ.  A private corporation, therefore, cannot 
be characterized as an organ of the State.  As a result, the conduct of a PMF, as a 
corporation, cannot be attributed to the State under Article 4.”). 
196 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 188, at 44 (“The conduct of a person or entity 
which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by the 
law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be con-
sidered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is 
acting in that capacity in the particular instance.”). 
197 Id. at 94 cmt.6. 
198 Id. at 92 cmt.2.  
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The second element of Article 5 requires that the entity in ques-
tion be “empowered by the law of the state” to conduct the act in 
question.199  Again, the Draft Articles provide no specific guidance 
regarding how to interpret the element, such as whether to construe 
it broadly or narrowly.  James Crawford, former Special Rapporteur 
on state responsibility, commented that the “usual and obvious” ap-
proach to empowerment “will be a delegation or authorization by 
or under the law of the State.”200 
Within the meaning of Article 5, and by guidance of the Com-
mentary, it would appear that at least some PMFs and PMCs meet 
the first element of “governmental function.”  For example, Titan 
and CACI’s guarding and interrogations of detainees at Abu Ghraib 
meet the Commentary’s example of “prison guards” and/or “pow-
ers of detention and discipline” that fall within the understanding 
of exercising “governmental authority.”  The second element is sat-
isfied by the fact that state actors, whether they are specific depart-
ments or branches of government, legally empowered through the 
acceptance or authorization of the President and Congress, are out-
sourcing and delegating their duties and responsibilities to PMFs 
and PMCs. 
Article 8 is relevant in cases where a PMF or PMC does not fall 
within the definition of Article 5.201  Under Article 8, “[t]he conduct 
of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State 
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact 
acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that 
State in carrying out the conduct.”202  The degree of control required 
for a State to be liable has been a subject of considerable debate in 
international courts.  In Nicaragua v. United States, the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) applied a narrow agency test, holding that 
in order for the United States to be responsible for the acts of the 
Contra rebels in Nicaragua—which the United States had armed, 
																																								 																				
199 Id. at 44.  
200 James Crawford (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, First Rep. on State 
Responsibility, Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.6, at 3 (1998), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CN.4/490/Add.6 
[https://perma.cc/8CEG-8Q8G]. 
201 Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors: Status and State Responsibility 
for their actions, Aug. 29–30, 2005, http://www.adh-
geneve.ch/evenements/pdf/colloques/2005/2rapport_compagnies_privees.pdf 
at 23. 
202 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 188, at 45 (Conduct directed or controlled by 
a State).  
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trained, and financed—it would need to be proven that the United 
States had “effective control” of the Contras’ military operations.203  
According to the Court, the “mere funding, organizing, training, 
supplying and equipping” of the rebels was not sufficient to estab-
lish state responsibility.204 
In response, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) noted, in Prosecutor v. 
Tadić, that the ICJ’s “effective control” test was inconsistent with the 
logic of the law of state responsibility, stating: 
Under this Article, if it is proved that individuals who are 
not regarded as organs of a State by its legislation neverthe-
less do in fact act on behalf of that State, their acts are at-
tributable to the State.  The rationale behind this rule is to 
prevent States from escaping international responsibility by 
having private individuals carry out tasks that may not or 
should not be performed by State officials, or by claiming 
that individuals actually participating in governmental au-
thority are not classified as State organs under national leg-
islation and therefore do not engage State responsibility. 205 
As a result, the ICTY put forth its “overall control” test regarding 
state liability and attribution.206  The ICTY stated, “[t]he requirement 
of international law for the attribution to States of acts performed by 
private individuals is that the State exercises control over the indi-
viduals.  The degree of control may, however, vary according to the 
factual circumstances of each case.”207  The ICTY outlined examples 
of attribution to the state.  In one it explained: 
[W]hen a State entrusts a private individual (or group of in-
dividuals) with the specific task of performing lawful actions 
on its behalf, but then the individuals, in discharging that 
																																								 																				
203 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf [https://perma.cc/238Z-5A8X].  
204 Id. 
205 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 117 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber July 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5LXT-8CXC]. 
206 See id. at ¶ 120 (“Consequently, for the attribution to a State of acts of these 
groups it is sufficient to require that the group as a whole be under the overall con-
trol of the State.”).  
207 Id. at ¶ 117. 
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task, breach an international obligation of the State (for in-
stance, a private detective is requested by State authorities to 
protect a senior foreign diplomat but he instead seriously 
mistreats him while performing that task). In this case, by 
analogy with the rules concerning State responsibility for 
acts of State officials acting ultra vires, it can be held that the 
State incurs responsibility on account of its specific request 
to the private individual or individuals to discharge a task 
on its behalf.208 
In response to the ICTY’s ruling, the ICJ reaffirmed its “effective 
control test” in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro.209  
The ICJ ruled “to equate persons or entities with State organs when 
they do not have that status under internal law must be exceptional, 
for it requires proof of a particularly great degree of State control 
over them, a relationship [of] . . . ‘complete dependence.’”210 
While determining which test should apply is debated, there are 
many cases where PMCs’ actions could be attributable to the state 
via either test.  For example, the “funding, organizing, training, sup-
plying and equipping” of rebels in Nicaragua was not sufficient to 
meet the requirements of Nicaragua’s effective control test, presum-
ably because that did not bridge the gap between support of a group 
and the ability to direct its every action.  However, the presence of a 
contract that sets out obligations and objectives of the PMF’s activi-
ties, along with the prospect of terminating the contract if the obli-
gations are not met, indicates a greater level of control than was pre-
sent in Nicaragua.  The “overall control” test is easier to apply; 
whereby, it seems that most PMCs, hired by states and operating in 
support of that state’s military objectives, would fall within the 
meaning of control provided by the Tadić court.  While this is only a 
very brief and cursory review of the state responsibility doctrine, 
cases of attribution are highly fact specific,211 and leave considerable 
wiggle room, as well as inconsistent determination.  Overall, the un-
derstanding of the doctrine of state responsibility, as it currently ex-
																																								 																				
208 Id. at ¶ 119. 
209 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 
Rep. 46 (Feb. 26). 
210 Id. at ¶ 393.  
211 See, e.g., ILC Draft Articles, supra note 188, at 107–08, cmt.6 (discussing fac-
tual differences in prior international tribunal cases).  
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ists and applies to PMFs and PMCs, is unclear and, frankly, un-
tested.  Thus, states continue to reap the benefits of using PMFs 
when it is advantageous for them, while maintaining plausible de-
niability when it is not.212 
 
6.  FILLING THE “LEGAL GAP” WITH AN INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTION 
 
In reviewing the existing laws applicable to PMCs, international 
and domestic law do not fill the legal gap in which PMFs and PMCs 
currently operate.  This gap in the law, particularly with regards to 
human rights protections, makes it more likely that both human 
rights violations will occur and punishment for these violations will 
be avoided.213 
PMFs are inherently problematic to regulate on a domestic level, 
as they are transnational corporations “located in one country, re-
cruit[ing] employees outside their home countries and deploy[ing] 
them in yet another country . . . .”214  Thus, regulation by individual 
states is unlikely and has proved to be insufficient to properly over-
see PMCs’ activities and provide proper redress when human rights 
violations occur.215  According to the Working Group on Mercenar-
																																								 																				
212 See Morgan, supra note 69, at 239 (“First, states employing or hosting PMFs 
may choose to ignore the problem and adopt an ad hoc position of seeking to reap 
the benefits of the use and association with such firms when advantageous to state 
interests, while maintaining plausible deniability when it is not.”).  
213 U.N. Secretary-General, Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human 
Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, ¶ 71, U.N. 
Doc. A/71/318 (Aug. 9, 2016), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N16/254/52/pdf/N1625452.pdf?OpenElement 
[https://perma.cc/6G87-6QP5] (“All actors who use violence are accountable for 
their actions under international humanitarian law and international criminal law, 
regardless of their status.  However, to the extent that mercenaries and foreign 
fighters use force outside the control of the sovereign State and, in particular, out-
side the relatively robust mechanisms for human rights protection in national mil-
itary forces, they may be more likely both to violate human rights and to avoid 
punishment for doing so.”).  
214 Rona, supra note 184, at 344. 
215 See id. at 343 (“In addition to the need to hold PMSCs and their employees 
accountable for their actions, victims of human rights violations involving PMSCs 
should be able to exercise their right to an effective remedy. Ideally, they should be 
able to do so locally.  However, victims often live in countries with weak judicial 
systems.  Even where victims are able to bring cases to the courts in the countries 
where PMSCs are established, such cases are rarely successful for the same reasons 
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ies, the fact that PMCs are not usually considered mercenaries, de-
spite providing similar services, is a strong argument for the adop-
tion of an international convention to clearly define and deal with 
this new type of actor.216  In 2010, the Working Group on Mercenar-
ies recommended to the U.N. General Assembly and the Human 
Rights Council, draft text for an International Convention on the 
Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Secu-
rity Companies.217  The result was a draft treaty that (1) defined 
“functions which are inherently State functions” and reiterated that 
these functions should not be “outsourced under any circum-
stances;” (2) reaffirmed States’ obligations to ensure respect for in-
ternational humanitarian law and international human rights law 
by PMFs and PMCs; (3) created a registration and licensing mecha-
nism for PMFs; (4) established a committee to oversee and monitor 
the implementation of the convention and PMFs’ activities; and (5) 
created a compensation system for victims of human rights viola-
tions committed by PMFs and their contractors.218 
Many U.N. member states support the idea of an international 
convention that would create a definitive set of laws for holding 
PMFs and PMCs, as well as those who employ them, accountable 
																																								 																				
that criminal prosecutions often fail (availability of witnesses, lack of evidence, 
etc.”)). 
216 See, e.g., Gómez del Prado, supra note 185, at 163 (“The fact that PMSCs’ 
personnel are not usually ‘mercenaries’ is also a strong argument for the adoption 
of a new instrument to deal with a new type of actor.  Contrary to the ‘dogs of war’ 
mercenaries of the past, private military and security companies are legally regis-
tered, and the definition used in international instruments—such as the one con-
tained in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and the one in the UN 
Convention on Mercenaries—typically does not apply to their personnel.”).  
217 See, e.g., José Luis Gómez del Prado (Chairperson/Rapporteur), U.N. Hu-
man Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of 
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Deter-
mination, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25, annex, at 10, ¶ 32 (July 2, 2010), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/docs/A.HRC.15.25.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z9JJ-Q2FP] (“The Working Group has repeatedly expressed its 
concern regarding the impact of the activities of PMSCs on the enjoyment of human 
rights.  In its mission reports it has provided detailed information regarding grave 
human rights violations perpetrated by their employees, in particular when oper-
ating in conflict or post-conflict areas, and the lack of transparency and accounta-
bility of PMSCs.”).  
218 See id. at 13, ¶ 49.  For further discussion of the convention, see Gómez del 
Prado, supra note 185.  
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for violations of human rights.219  Other international bodies, includ-
ing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, a statu-
tory organization that oversees the European Court of Human 
Rights, have emphasized the need for an international legally bind-
ing instrument.220  However, the prime opposition for this sort of 
rule setting has been states like the United States and the United 
Kingdom, who have significant ties to, and make significant use of, 
PMFs.221  As of 2008, eighty percent (80%) of PMFs were registered 
in these two countries alone.222 
In the December 2016 interstate working session on the draft 
convention, states remained divided over the need for an interna-
tional convention on this matter.  The United States stated that its 
prosecution of the PMCs in the Nisour Square case “demonstrates 
the necessity of utilizing the force of domestic law to deliver ac-
countability for wrongdoers and protect human rights. It does not 
demonstrate the need for new international law.”223  Instead, the 
																																								 																				
219 See Gómez del Prado, supra note 185, at 164 (stating the majority of U.N. 
members, “upon considering the impact of PMSCs on human rights, assert the 
opinion that outsourcing functions related to the legitimate use of force to private 
contractors requires binding regulatory and monitoring mechanisms at the interna-
tional level due to the transnational character of the industry.”). 
220 See U.N. NEWS CENTRE, supra note 94 (“Support for a legally binding treaty 
has been expressed by regional bodies, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, citing concerns at the lack of transparency and accountability of 
private military and security companies.”).  
221 See, e.g., Laurence Juma, Privatisation, Human Rights and Security: Reflections 
on the Draft International Convention on Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private 
Military and Security Companies, 15 L. DEMOCRACY & DEV. 182, 183–84 (2011), 
http://www.ldd.org.za/images/stories/Ready_for_publication/juma-new.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DL4K-3PDE] (“Whereas the Latin American, Asian and African 
countries have at least signified their support for some form of binding interna-
tional framework for the regulation of PMSCs, Western nations, mainly the USA 
and the UK, have expressed serious doubts about the necessity of a multilateral 
regime of this kind.”).  
222 José L. Gómez del Prado, Private Military and Security Companies and the U.N. 
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 429, 438 (2009) (“The 
new trends indicate that, in the twenty-first century, PMSCs are absorbing tradi-
tional mercenaries and experienced militaries from established armed forces.  Some 
governments, in particular that of the United States and the United Kingdom, 
where it is estimated that [eighty percent] of all PMSCs operating worldwide are 
registered, have left the expansion and regulation of this new industry to the ‘invis-
ible hand of the market.’”).  
223 Fifth Session Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Private 
Military and Security Companies, U.S. Government Delegation Closing Statement, 
(Dec. 12–16, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ 
WGMilitary/Session5/US_closing_statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5PM-
Y9UC].  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/3
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United States suggested that the interstate group should turn their 
efforts towards improving the existing international regulatory 
mechanisms, like the Montreux Document and the ICoCA.224 
In opposition, states like India225 and South Africa226 argued the 
need for more robust international norms, including an interna-
tional convention, to close the loopholes not addressed under cur-
rent law and the regulatory mechanisms.  Chairperson of the ses-
sion, Ambassador Mxakato-Diseko, expressed her frustration for the 
stagnation of the convention, asking “how close are we towards con-
vergence . . . and is this ever likely to happen? Is it possible ever for 
parties to find each other over this matter?”227 
The absence of an effective legal framework that governs the 
conduct of PMFs and their contractors is highly problematic consid-
ering their prominence in modern warfare and their history of com-
mitting unpunished human rights violations.  As entities, PMFs can 
exist anywhere in the world, meaning that a “global framework that 
																																								 																				
224 Id. (“To the contrary, the United States agrees wholeheartedly with the need 
for enhanced international and multi-stakeholder collaboration and coordination 
in this area.  In fact, that is why the United States has been and is a strong supporter 
of the Montreux Document Forum and the International Code of Conduct Associ-
ation.  We believe that this Group should focus on developing an action plan for 
States to improve the regulatory framework for this industry.”).  
225 Fifth Session Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Private 
Military and Security Companies, Statement by India, (Dec. 12–16, 2016), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGMilitary/Ses-
sion5/India_Statement_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/646E-SZLA] (“At [the] inter-
national level, existing law and jurisprudence remind us that there are gaps in in-
ternational law particularly in establishing proper mechanisms for accountability 
and effective remedies for the victims.”).  
226 Fifth Session Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Private 
Military and Security Companies, Statement Delivered by South Africa, (Dec. 12, 
2016), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGMilitary/Pages/OEIWG 
MilitarySession5.aspx [https://perma.cc/J6KU-7REL] (“The national and interna-
tional regulatory frameworks outlined during the past four Sessions of the Working 
Group identified the clear normative and supervisory gaps and insufficiencies in 
the legal framework which has by and large been ineffective to ensure the minimal 
threshold of human rights and humanitarian law in the context of PMSCs’ activi-
ties.”).  
227 Fifth Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to 
Consider the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory Framework on 
the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of Private Military and Secu-
rity Companies: Concluding Remarks by Ambassador Mxakato-Diseko Chairperson-Rap-
porteur, (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCoun-
cil/WGMilitary/Session5/ConcludingRemarks5thIGWGChairpersonRapporteur.
pdf [https://perma.cc/FDB3-C5VH].  
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relies [solely] on national regulation may lead to a race to the bot-
tom, where PMFs seek incorporation in the most permissive legal 
regime.”228  By their very nature, PMFs will be taking action in the-
aters of war and conflict all over the world, each with different legal 
regimes and rules, and they will be acting on behalf of nations with 
different regulations than those applicable to either the nation of 
their incorporation or the area in which they are acting.  PMFs are 
truly international actors, therefore, their regulation requires an in-
ternationally coordinated effort. 
Adopting “a norm of incorporation” through “a new treaty re-
gime” can draw on the strengths of domestic and international sys-
tems and establish needed standards and a means to hold PMCs, the 
firms that employ them, and the States that contract with them, to 
account for their actions.229  At a minimum, a convention should en-
sure that either states clearly incorporate their PMFs and PMCs into 
their armed forces so that they are conclusively subject to the laws 
of war and state attribution, or that if PMCs are not incorporated, 
ensure they are not exempt from civilian criminal law.  Unfortu-
nately, until an international consensus is reached regarding how to 
address the legal gap, human rights violations will continue to occur 
with impunity. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
The years following the September 11th attacks have seen a seis-
mic shift in the international landscape concerning the threats and 
dangers facing nations and the international community.  This new 
dynamic has led to a paradigm shift in how wars are fought and the 
actors involved, including a dramatic increase in the use of PMCs.  
With the increasing privatization of war, it is necessary to clarify 
what legal regimes apply and the important legal obligations under 
the law, specifically international law. 
Existing law is vague, conflicting, and incomplete regarding 
PMCs and their conduct, resulting in a “legal gap,” whereby PMCs 
																																								 																				
228 Morgan, supra note 69, at 245. 
229 Id. (“To this end, adoption of a norm of incorporation—either through ref-
erence to existing international law, a new treaty regime, or evolving customary 
international law—draws on the strengths of both systems: international legal and 
diplomatic consensus centered on a shared norm of state responsibility dovetailed 
with the functional capabilities of domestic legal regimes.”).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/3
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can operate free from meaningful accountability and consequence.  
Therefore, while it is important to understand the present gaps in 
the law, it is imperative that States formulate comprehensive and 
effective tools to guarantee accountability and responsibility of 
PMFs, PMCs, and the states that utilize them.  Although construc-
tive attempts have been made at overseeing PMFs’ and PMCs’ ac-
tions, without changes to the international legal framework, PMFs 
and PMCs can continue to operate with impunity and without ac-
countability to the detriment of human rights and justice. 
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